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MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS IN TEXAS
by
Eldon L. Youngblood*
M ECHANICS' liens originated in the United States as a statutory creation.'
No such concept existed at common law or in equity,' and no similar
legislation has ever been passed in England.! The first mechanic's lien law in
this country was enacted in the state of Maryland in 1791 on the recommenda-
tion of a commission organized to improve the city of Washington.! By passing
"an act securing to master builders a lien on houses erected and land occupied,"
the legislature sought to stimulate the rapid development of the new capitol
city. Apparently, the experiment was a success; Pennsylvania followed with a
similar statute in 1803,' and eventually every state in the union enacted me-
chanic's lien laws to spur the growth of its cities in the wake of the great ex-
pansion of the nineteenth century.'
The mechanic's lien appeared in Texas in 1839 when the Congress of the
Republic enacted "An act for the Relief of Master Builders and Mechanics of
Texas."' This early statute was admirably uncomplicated. A contractor erecting
a building in an incorporated city or town under a written contract with the
owner was given a lien on the building and the land on which it was situated,
provided he recorded his contract within thirty days after its making. No other
filing or notice requirement was imposed.
In 1844 the Congress passed "An Act for the Better Security of Mechanics
and Others"' which, for the first time, accorded lien benefits to subcontractors.
Coupled with the Act of 1839, it began to mold our present statutory scheme.
This act allowed an unpaid subcontractor performing on a written contract to
deliver an attested account of the value of his work or materials to the owner,
and thereby require the owner to retain from funds due the contractor a
sufficient amount to pay the subcontractor's account. The owner was further
required to furnish a copy of the account to his contractor, and if the contrac-
tor failed to dispute the claim within ten days, the owner was required to
*B.A., Texas Christian University; LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
'Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 24 S.W. 275 (1893). The term "mechanic's lien,"
as used in this Article, encompasses the lien given for materialmen as well as workmen. Al-
though it is sometimes important to emphasize the distinction between a mechanic and
a materialman, the conjunctive form is often discarded by courts and commentators.
'Morrison v. State Trust Co., 274 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1925), rev'd
on other grounds, 282 S.W. 214 (1926). Mechanics' liens have long existed in the civil
law. See CODE NAPOLEON, Privileges and Mortgages § 2, art. 2103; C. Civ. art. 2103
(Cachard 1930). A mechanic or artisan may have a lien at common law for the value of
his services in manufacturing or repairing a chattel, but he must retain possession of the
chattel. McBride v. Beakley, 203 S.W. 1137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918).
' Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YALE L.J.
138 (1958).4 Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Indianapolis, N.C. & T. Ry., 179 Ind. 356, 101 N.E.
296 (1913).
5Id.6 1d. See also S. KNEELAND, A TREATISE UPON THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE
ACQUISITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MECHANIC'S LIENS 12 (2d ed. 1882); Woodward,
The Acquisition of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens on Non-Homestead Property, 14
SW. L.J. 469 (1960).7 Act of Jan. 23, 1839, [1839] Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 66 (1898).
'Act of Feb. 5, 1844, [1844] Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1008 (1898).
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deliver enough of the funds withheld to pay the subcontractor's claim. If the
owner paid his contractor in advance, he was liable to the subcontractor for
any loss resulting from a premature payment.
The essential purpose and scheme of these early Texas statutes has remained
intact for over a century, despite numerous comprehensive amendments, de-
letions, and additions throughout the period. Pursuant to these acts, the owner's
original contractor had a direct lien on the improvement and associated realty
to secure his debt, and the subcontractor, while not entitled to a direct lien,
was accorded an efficient means of satisfying his debt by trapping funds due
the contractor in the hands of the owner. The present mechanic's lien laws
have virtually the same objectives. But the procedures prescribed by the cur-
rent statutes, particularly procedures for perfecting the subcontractor's lien,
have become vastly more complex and unwieldy. Indeed, it well may be argued
that the cumulated amendments of a century have been counterproductive to
the interests of those for whom the original statutes were enacted.
The central purpose of this Article is to survey and, hopefully, simplify the
Texas law pertaining to mechanics' liens. A second purpose, born of the frus-
tration experienced in pursuit of the first, is to suggest improvements in the
present scheme.
Part I analyzes the so-called "statutory lien," the direct descendant of the
aforementioned Acts of the Republic; Part II examines the quite separate, but
less significant, lien created by the Texas Constitution;9 Part III undertakes a
review of Texas law applicable to the relative priorities between mechanics'
liens and other encumbrances; Part IV deals with payment bonds prescribed
and permitted by the Hardeman Act" and the McGregor Act;1  and Part V
undertakes to study feasible means of improving our present system. An at-
tempt has been made throughout to place the current laws in their historical
context.
It is a convention in survey articles to disclaim any intention to cover a fair
number of topics arguably a part of the subject being surveyed. In that con-
nection, no attempt will be made herein to discuss contractual mechanics'
liens or liens on chattels given by statute or by the Texas Constitution; the
scope of this Article is limited to liens on real property and fixtures which arise
by operation of law. Moreover, no detailed discussion is entered upon with
respect to statutory liens on oil and mineral property"2 or liens provided by
statute for farm, factory, and store operatives."8 Finally, the discussion of
surety bonds in Part IV does not encompass the requirements of the Miller
Act," or other laws of the United States pertaining to bonding requirements
on federal building projects.
9 TExAs CONST. art. XVI, § 37 (1869).
10Ch. 382, § 1, [1961) Tex. Laws 863. Bonds with respect to private improvements
are permitted by TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5472c (1958), 5472d (Supp. 1972).
Bonds and liens with respect to public improvements are covered by id. arts. 5472a (Supp.
1972), 5472b, 5472b-1 (1958).
11TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (1958).
" Id. arts. 5480-82.
1 Id. arts. 5483-88.
1440 U.S.C. §5 270(a)-(e) (1970).
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I. THE STATUTORY LIEN
A. Historical Development
For more than twenty-five years the Acts of the Republic"2 regulated the
mechanic's lien rights of workmen and materialmen in Texas. The next de-
velopment came with the Texas Constitution of 1869, which asserted the
rights of mechanics and artisans to a lien and directed the legislature to provide
for its speedy and efficient enforcement." In 1871, in response to the consti-
tutional admonition, the legislature passed "An Act to Provide for and Regu-
late Mechanics, Contractors, Builders and Other Liens in the State of Texas."1 '
This act was the genesis of a number of modern concepts: the lien was ex-
tended to "any improvement whatever," whether in the city or country;"6 a lien
was provided for "repairs," as well as for construction work; and oral contracts
were for the first time made to support a mechanic's lien. The manner of per-
fecting the contractor's lien was "fixed" from the date of recordation of his
written contract (or if the contract was oral, recordation of a sworn bill of
particulars thereto) accompanied by a description of the affected real estate,
provided the contract was filed within six months after the debt became due.'"
The present constitution, adopted in 1876, contains a mechanic's lien section
which, except for minor changes, is identical to the 1869 provision.0 Shortly
after the adoption of the new constitution, the Act of 1871" was recodified to
include a slightly reworded version of the Act of 1844,2 which required an
owner to retain funds on presentation of an attested account by a subcontractor,
and a recitation of the constitutional requisites for enforcing liens on homestead
property.21
"
2 Act of Jan. 23, 1839, [1839) Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 66 (1898);
Act of Feb. 5, 1844, [18441 Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1008 (1898);
see text accompanying notes 7, 8 supra.
16TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 47 (1869).
"Ch. 34, § 1-6, [18711 Tex. Laws, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 30 (1898).
16 Id. Under the previous statute the lien applied only to work done on a "building"
in an incorporated city or town. See Act of Jan. 23, 1839, [1839] Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAM-
MEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 66 (1898).
"Ch. 34, §§ 1-6, [1871] Tex. Laws, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 30 (1898).
20 Mechanics, artisans, and material men, of every class, shall have a lien upon
the buildings and articles made or repaired by them for the value of their
labor done thereon, or material furnished therefor; and the Legislature shall
provide by law for the speedy and efficient enforcement of said liens.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37 (italics indicate the additions); see part II intra.
2
1 Ch. 34, §§ 1-6, [1871] Tex. Laws, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 30 (1898).2 2 Act of Feb. 5, 1844, [1844] Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1008
(1898).2
1TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 provides, in part, that a homestead may be subject to
forced sale for payment of debts "for work and material used in constructing improvements
thereon . . . only when the work and material are contracted for in writing, with the con-
sent of the wife given in the same manner as is required in making a sale and conveyance
of the homestead .... " The 1876 revision to the mechanic's lien statutes went further and
required the mechanic or materialman to obtain a written contract signed by the husband
and wife and acknowledged by the wife as required when making a sale of the homestead,
at the time the work is done or the materials furnished. In addition, he was required to re-
cord the contract in the county clerk's office in the county where the improvements were
made or the land situated. See ch. 81, § 1-8, [1876] Tex. Laws, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 927 (1898).
The current statute is very similar. However, the exemption is now limited to the home-
stead of a married person; the contract must be recorded before performance; and the con-
tractor's compliance with the formalities is specifically made to inure to the benefit of sub-
contractors. See TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 5460 (1958).
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A comprehensive amendment in 188524 introduced the current concept that
the filing period for the subcontractor should be briefer than that applicable
to the original contractor: The original contractor was required to file his
contract or affidavit within four months after "the indebtedness shall have
accrued," but the subcontractor was given only thirty days." In addition, the
current preference enjoyed by mechanics' lien holders over prior liens on the
land was introduced in this amendment, which, with the exception of the word
"accrual,""0 employed the language of section 1 of the present article 54597'
Several other concepts in our present law first appeared in this amendment:
(1 ) the original contractor was given the affirmative duty to defend any action
by a subcontractor to enforce his lien; (2) the owner was entitled to deduct
from sums owing the contractor the amount of any subcontractor's judgment
and costs, or, if he had previously paid the original contractor in full, he was
entitled to recover from him the amount of any judgment so paid; ' (3) the
money due the original contractor from the owner was made nongarnishable
by other creditors to the prejudice of subcontractors, who were given a prefer-
ence over other creditors of the original contractor;"' (4) all mechanics' liens
on the same improvement were placed on an equal footing without reference
to the date of filing;" and (5) a basic principle of Texas mechanic's lien law
was codified:
[IIn no case shall the owner be compelled to pay a greater sum for or on
account of labor performed or material, machinery, fixtures, and tools fur-
nished than the price or sum stipulated in the original contract between such
owner and the original contractor for such house, building, fixtures, improve-
ments or repairs."
Another innovation of this amendment survived up to the Hardeman Act of
1961: a subcontractor was required to give at least ten days notice in writing
to the owner before he filed a lien claim, stating the amount of his claim and
from whom it was due."2
- Ch. 66, § 1, [1885) Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 683 (1898).
2 Id. at 683-84. Under the current statute an original contractor must file his lien affi-
davit within 120 days after the indebtedness accrues; a subcontractor is given 90 days after
the accrual of indebtedness. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (1958).
20 In an 1889 revision the phrase "accrual of the lien" was changed to "inception of the
lien." Ch. 98, §§ 1-20, [1889] Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1138 (1898).
See notes 201-05 infra, and accompanying text.
" See ch. 66, 5 1, [1885) Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 683, 684 (1898).
*"These concepts are now embodied in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5463, § 2
(1958) in essentially the same language.2 5TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5464 (1958) was left untouched by the Hardeman
Act. It was finalized in 1889 and provides essentially the same protection as the 1885 amend-
ment: "All subcontractors, laborers and materialmen shall have preference ov er other credi-
tors of the principal contractor or builder." It has been held that the preference here given
is applicable only to those subcontractors who have liens. Lebo v. Dochen, 310 S.W.2d
715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958), error ref. n.r.e.
"
0 The current statute is TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5468 (1958).3' Ch. 66, 5 1, [1885) Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 683 (1898). While
the principle embodied in this provision is as viable as ever, there is no clear statement of
it in our current statutes. However, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5463, § 2 (Supp.
1972) limits the liability of the owner in somewhat the same fashion: "The owner shall
in no case be required to pay, nor his property be liable for, any money, other than that
required to be retained by him under the provisions of Article 5469 ...." See, e.g., Loner-
gan v. San Antonio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061 (1907).
' The deletion of this requirement was a salutary accomplishment of the Hardeman Act.
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An 1889 amendment" severely complicated the lien-perfecting procedure
prescribed for materialmen. One who furnished materials was required to give
written notice to the owner of "each and every item as it is furnished" and "how
much there is due and unpaid on each bill of lumber furnished . . .within
ninety days after the indebtedness shall have accrued.""4 The event which
marked when the indebtedness accrued was alternatively defined:
When labor is performed by the day or week, then the indebtedness shall be
deemed to have accrued at the end of the week during which labor is per-
formed. When material is furnished the indebtedness shall be deemed to have
accrued at the date of the last delivery of such material, unless there is an
agreement to pay for such material at a specified time.'
Minor amendments followed in 1895, " but by the turn of the century the
statutory scheme was basically set in the form in which it was to remain. Later
amendments required the owner to retain ten percent of the original contract
price during the progress of the work and for thirty days after completion for
the sole benefit of artisans and mechanics;' expanded the kinds of improve-
ments for which a lien is given; " and lengthened, to three months, the period
during which a subcontractor may file his contract or affidavit.'
In August 1961 the legislature enacted the Hardeman Act, the most
thoroughgoing revision to the mechanic's lien laws yet attempted. Of the
twenty-five relevant statutes in existence at the time, nine were amended, four
were repealed, and one new article was added." This Act was the culmination
of long efforts by representatives of various segments of the construction in-
dustry to revise a body of laws with which there was general dissatisfaction."
Industry complaints were evident from the emergency clause of the Act, which
In 1889 the statute was amended to exempt from the requirement materialmen claiming
under § 3 of the 1889 Act (which section contained the 90-day notice provision). Ch. 98,§§ 1-20, [1889] Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 113 (1898). The principal
difficulty was determining to whom the requirement was applicable. See Woodward, supra
note 6.53Ch. 98, §§ 1-20, [1889] Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1138 (1898).
'Id. at 1139. This requirement was further extended to those who perform labor by
ch. 224, 5 1, [1929] Tex. Laws 478. The requirement of itemization was an onerous one,
necessitating a meticulous listing of each item of labor and material separately and the
unit price of each. In Woodward, supra note 6, it was severely criticized for exalting form
over substance. Possibly as a result of Professor Woodward's urging, the Hardeman Act
did away with the itemization requirement entirely.
3Ch. 98, § 15, [1889] Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1142 (1898).
36Railroad improvements were included in the scope of improvements on which the
lien would attach, and rights available to natural persons were specifically made applicable
to corporations. Ch. 126, §§ 1-10, [1895] Tex. Laws, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
924 (1898).
37 This requirement is now embodied in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp.
1972). It took on much greater significance when its benefits were extended to all sub-
contractors by the Hardeman Act. See text accompanying notes 153-56 infra. Materialmen
derived no benefits from the original statute.
3 Ch. 124, [19133 Tex. Laws 252 provided a mechanic's lien for construction or repair
of "levees or embankments to be erected for the reclamation of overflow lands along any
river or creek in this state." Improvements to a homestead and "clearing, grubbing, draining
and fencing land" were included by ch. 171, § 1, [1917] Tex. Laws 383. "Grubbing out
of domestic orchards, replacing trees, pruning, cultivating and caring for orchard trees"
were added by ch. 348, § 1, [1951] Tex. Laws 593.
39 Ch. 224, 5 1, [19291 Tex. Laws 478.4 0Amended: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-56, 5463, 5467-69; Repealed: id.
arts. 5457, 5461, 5462, 5465; Added: id. art. 5472d.
" See Woodward, supra note 6.
19721
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cited "the fact that existing statutes governing mechanics and materialmens
liens are antiquated, vague, and ambiguous, and have been the subject of
numerous court decisions resulting in loss of liens through technicalities."42
The resulting Act was an industry-drawn compromise between general con-
tractors and materialmen groups which, despite meritorious efforts, fell woe-
fully short of correcting the shortcomings of the cumulated amendments of a
century.
B. The Hardeman Act and the Mechanic's Lien Today
Articles 5452-5471" constitute the present body of statutes pertaining to the
acquisition of mechanics' liens on real estate.' Article 5452 is the basic statute.
It provides a lien for those who "labor," "specially fabricate material," or
"furnish labor or material" under a contract with the owner, his agent, trustee,
or his contractor, or any subcontractor, for the construction or repair of (1) a
house, building, or improvement, (2) a levy or embankment to be erected for
the reclamation of overflow lands along a river or creek, or (3) a railroad.
Persons Entitled to Lien. The categories of possible lien claimants set forth in
the statute are broad enough to include every type of workman on a building
and every materialman who furnishes materials for its construction.' Accord-
ingly, any person with legal capacity who furnishes labor or material, or
specially fabricates material for construction or repair of one of the enumerated
structures, is entitled to perfect the lien. The manner in which the lien is
established, however, is primarily dependent on the fundamental question
whether the claimant is an "original contractor" or a "subcontractor."
Article 54 52e defines an "original contractor" as one "contracting with an
owner directly or through his agent." A subcontractor is defined as "any per-
son or corporation who has furnished labor or materials or both... to fulfill
an obligation to an original contractor or to a subcontractor to perform all or
part of the work required by an original contractor.'"" Subcontractors are often
42 Ch. 382, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 863.43TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-71 (Supp. 1972).
"Id. arts. 5160 (1971), 5472(a), 5472(b), 5472b-l (1958), 5472c, 5472d (Supp.
1972) pertain to liens on payment bonds or funds payable on public works. Liens on oil
and mineral property are provided in arts. 5473-79. Liens on fixtures and chattels are given
to farm, factory, and store operatives by arts. 5483-88. Article 5472e makes certain monies
"trust funds" for the benefit of contractors and subcontractors.
'Bassett v. Mills, 89 Tex. 162, 34 S.W. 93 (1896).
46 These terms were not defined by statute prior to the Hardeman Act. "Original con-
tractor" was long ago defined by the supreme court in essentially the terms used in the
Hardeman Act. Matthews v. Waggenhaeuser Brewing Ass'n, 83 Tex. 604, 19 S.W. 150, 151
(1892). The term "subcontractor" is now used more freely in the statutes to encompass
other designations employed conjunctively in previous enactments, such as "materialman,"
"journeyman," or "laborer." Historically, the term "subcontractor" referred to one who
takes from the principal contractor a specific part of the work, and did not encompass those
contracting with a subcontractor or a materialman. Huddleston v. Nislar. 72 S.W.2d 959
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934), error ref. It is unfortunate that the drafters saw fit to
use the word being defined in the definition itself. Presumably it was done in an attempt
to make clear that one who supplies labor or material to a person contracting with the
original contractor for part of his work has the lien. But what is the status of one who
furnishes material to the supplier of a materialman who contracts with the original con-
tractor? Bassett v. Mills, 89 Tex. 162, 34 S.W. 93 (1896), made it clear that the lien is
available to a workman or materialman irrespective of the tier at which he makes his con-
tribution. It would be unfortunate if a contrary intention were attributed to the legislature
because of the awkward definition of "subcontractor" provided by the Hardeman Act.
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referred to as "derivative claimants" because their lien is "derived" from the
original contractor's lien.47
Properly characterizing the claimant as an original contractor or subcontract-
or is important because a subcontractor is not entitled to a constitutional lien,"
and it is relatively difficult for him to perfect a statutory lien."' On the other
hand, an original contractor often has a constitutional lien automatically,"
and the manner of perfecting his statutory lien is relatively simple."
For years many developers used "dummy" or "sham" original contractors in
order that all of the persons with whom they dealt would be considered sub-
contractors, instead of original contractors." In 1965 the legislature attempted
to eliminate that practice by enacting article 5452-1." That statute permits a
workman or materialman to have original contractor status if he (1) con-
tracts with a corporation effectively controlled by the owner, or (2) contracts
with an original contractor under circumstances where there is no good faith
intention between the owner and that original contractor that the contract be
performed.' It further provides that an owner or sham contractor who, with
intent to defraud, makes false written statements that a bill has been paid
may be punished by fine and imprisonment."
Effort for Which Lien Provided. The statutory lien is available only to those
who furnish labor in the direct prosecution of the work, furnish material
actually delivered, or specially fabricate undelivered material."6
Labor. The requirement that labor furnished be "used in the direct prose-
cution of the work" was included in article 5452 for the first time by the
" In the first instance, the subcontractor's lien is dependent on the original contractor's
lien being unextinguished by payment, but a penalty lien is given against the owner for
breach of his obligations to retain funds. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5463, 5469
(Supp. 1972); see text accompanying notes 161-67 infra. However, the failure of the
original contractor to perfect his lien does not affect the subcontractor's rights.
"
8 First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 194 S.W. 1146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1917), aff'd, 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919).49 See text accompanying notes 126-43 infra.
"Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896).
"See text accompanying notes 107-25 infra.
"2By "paying" the sham original contractor in full at the beginning of work, all liens
except those given for failure to abide by the 10% statutory retainage requirement were
extinguished. See note 47 supra.
"CCh. 175, § 1, [1965] Tex. Laws 368.
'
4TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452-1, § 1 (Supp. 1972) provides:
Whenever any owner of real property shall enter into any contract with a
corporation for [construction) . . . thereon, and said owner can effectively
control the corporation with whom such contract is made . . . or, when any
owner of real property shall enter into such a contract with any natural
person or corporation for such construction or repair, and it shall be proved
that such contract was made without good faith intention on the part of
the parties thereto that it was to be performed .. . [then) any person, firm
or corporation who, under a direct contractual relationship with said person
or corporation and who may labor, specially fabricate material, or furnish
labor or material to be used in the prosecution of the work under such con-
tract shall be deemed to be in a direct contractual relationship with the
owner and may perfect his lien against the property in the same manner as
any other original contractor.
Note that effective control by the owner of a contractor organized as a partnership or un-
incorporated association will not suffice.
"Id. § 2 (Supp. 1972) provides for a penalty consisting of a fine of not more than
$5,000 or less than $100, or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year,
or both.
"1d. art. 5452, S 2a (Supp. 1972).
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Hardeman Act. However, there is no indication in the case law that this legis-
lative addition was intended to change previous decisions respecting, for ex-
ample, the rights of architects or engineers to establish a lien for off-site labor
performed in drawing plans and specifications." It is probable that the new
statutory admonition is flexible enough to include such labor. "
Labor performed in installing fixtures, such as machinery or floor covering,
is includable as labor for which a mechanic's lien may be established,"9 and
a lien may be established for labor performed by the agent or the employee
of a mechanic's lien claimant." But not all labor performed in connection with
an improvement merits a mechanic's lien. For example, the services of an
attorney rendered to a contractor do not make the attorney a subcontractor
entitled to a lien on the owner's property for payment of his fees." Further-
more, since the lien is given only for construction or repair work, no lien is
available to one who performs labor in removing or demolishing a structure."2
Material. The Hardeman Act greatly expanded the definition of "material."
That term now encompasses not only materials which are to be incorporated in
the work, but certain consumable material as well, such as power, water, fuel,
and lubricants. Rent and repair expenses for construction equipment are also
included in the definition of "material."'
A requirement that all materials furnished be "incorporated in the work or
consumed in the direct prosecution of the work or ordered or delivered for
such incorporation or such consumption" was added by the 1961 revisions."4
It is not clear whether this requirement is intended merely to codify the exist-
ing case law or whether it excludes a lien for that part of the contract price
attributable to such items as transporting workers or hauling materials."5 The
language is perhaps desirable to discourage further attempts by enterprising
counsel to establish liens for materials consumed or used at a place remote
from the construction task, such as meals consumed by workers, " money lent
for construction, 7 or attorneys' fees."
5 7Atkinson v. Jackson Bros., 259 S.W. 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), rev'd on other
grounds, 270 S.W. 848 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925), holding approved; see Sanguinett &
Staats v. Colorado Salt Co., 150 S.W. 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1912), error ref.
" In Sanguinett & Staats v. Colorado Salt Co., 150 S.W. 490, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Ft. Worth 1912), error ref., the court wrote: "An architect who prepares the drawings,
plans and specifications for a building and superintends the erection thereof, may as truly
be said to perform labor thereon as any one who takes part in the work of construction."
An architect was awarded a constitutional lien in Atkinson v. Jackson Bros., 259 S.W. 280
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 270 S.W. 848 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925),
holding approved. It was suggested in Lancaster v. McKenzie, 439 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1965), that performing supervisory duties, in addition to drawing plans and
specifications, may be an indispensable condition to establishment of the lien.
"9Enlow v. Brown, 357 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962).
"
0 Wilson v. Hinton, 131 Tex. 593, 116 S.W.2d 365 (1938); Enlow v. Brown, 357
S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962).
61American Sur. Co. v. Stuart, 151 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941).
6" Big Three Welding Equip. Co. v. Crutcher, Rolfs, Cummings, Inc., 149 Tex. 204,
229 S.W.2d 600 (1950).
6 3 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, § 2b (Supp. 1972).6 4 1Id.
6 Woodward, supra note 6, at 473.
6See Van Horn Trading Co. v. Day, 148 S.W. 1129 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1912).
"
7See West v. First Baptist Church, 123 Tex. 388, 71 S.W.2d 1090 (1934).
" See American Sur. Co. v. Stuart, 151 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941).
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Specially Fabricated Materials. This is an entirely new category of effort for
which a lien was provided by the Hardeman Act. "Specially fabricated ma-
terial" is defined in section 2(c) of article 5452 as "material fabricated for
use as a component part of the construction or repair so as to be reasonably
unsuitable for use elsewhere, even though such material may not be delivered."
This addition was obviously made to protect the manufacturer of custom
items who expends time and money fabricating material which he cannot sell
to anyone else because of its uniqueness, but which is never delivered, perhaps
because of the insolvency of the owner or contractor." Special procedures for
perfecting the lien for specially fabricating materials are provided by article
54537" to ensure that the lien will be established even though the material is
never delivered to the job site.
Property Affected. The labor must have been performed or materials delivered
or specially fabricated for construction or repair of a house, building or im-
provement, a reclamation levee or embankment on a river or creek, or a rail-
road.71 The last two categories are infrequently applied and merit no more
than a passing mention."2 The terms "house, building or improvement" were
long ago held to encompass any structure permanently attached to realty." In
addition, section 1 of article 5452 includes the following items under the
definition of "improvement," although some are not definable as structures:
abutting sidewalks and streets and utilities therein; clearing, grubbing, drain-
ing or fencing of land; wells, cisterns, tanks, reservoirs, or artificial lakes or
pools made for supplying or storing water; all pumps, siphons, and windmills
or other machinery or apparatus used for raising water for stock, domestic use
or for irrigation purposes; and the planting of orchard trees, grubbing out of
orchards and replacing trees, and pruning said orchard trees.74
A mechanic's lien will not attach to mere personal property which is not
identifiable as a fixture.' However, it is often difficult to determine whether
a particular item is or is not a fixture. Various tests have been advanced, but
no clear, objective rule has emerged. The test most often approved involves
a weighing of three considerations: (1) the degree of actual or constructive
annexation of the property to the realty, (2) the adaptation of the item an-
nexed to the use or purpose served by the realty, and (3) the intention of the
annexor that the annexation be permanent." Of these considerations, the most
"' The lien on materials actually furnished could never be defeated by redirection to
another site. Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186 S.W.2d 66 (1945); Trammel
v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210, 4 S.W. 377 (1887). However, prior to the Hardeman Act, ma-
terials ordered, but refused or returned, did not give rise to a lienable claim. Murphy v.
Fleetford, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 70 S.W. 989 (1902).
7"See text accompanying notes 134, 135 infra.7 1 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, S 1 (Supp. 1972).
7'2 There are no reported cases in which a definitional problem has arisen in connection
with these categories.
7 Fagan & Osgood v. Boyle Ice Mach. Co., 65 Tex. 324 (1886).
"4 These odd categories were inserted in the statutes at various times, probably in re-
sponse to isolated complaints. See note 38 supra.
"5 McConnell v. Frost, 45 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932), error ref.; Lyon-
Gray Lumber Co. v. Nocona Cotton Oil Co., 194 S.W. 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1917).
6See, e.g., Hutchins v. Masterson, 46 Tex. 551 (1877); Ruby v. Cambridge Mut. Fire
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important is the intention of permanence; the other two are useful mainly as
evidence of intention. Thus, items of furniture, appliances, paintings, or
other articles only slightly or temporarily attached in a building usually retain
the character of a chattel."' But items which are so firmly attached to the
building that their severance would cause serious injury to the realty are usually
fixtures." It does not follow, however, that an item is personalty merely because
it is severable without causing injury. Non-severability may be strong evidence
that an item is a fixture, but many severable items can be fixtures."
If an intention that the item remain personalty is strongly manifested by
all of the circumstances, it will govern the question. Thus, the installation of
trade fixtures which a tenant expects to remove at the expiration of his lease
will not give rise to a mechanic's lien."0
Because of the definitional problem it is often advisable for a materialman
to perfect his security interest by following the procedure prescribed in article
9 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code,"l as well as by perfecting his
mechanic's lien; he is thus protected if his materials should be deemed per-
sonalty. A security interest in fixtures is not subject to the general Code exclu-
sion with respect to transactions creating liens on interests in real estate."
Mechanics' liens cannot be attached to public works. If materials or labor
are furnished for the construction or repair of a public building, structure or
grounds, such as a county courthouse," public road,' public schoolhouse, " or
public cemetery, " no mechanic's lien is available. The claimant's remedy on a
public project is limited to a statutory lien on funds payable under certain
small contracts," or a claim against a mandatory payment bond on larger
contracts."8
Ins. Co., 358 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962). See also 33 TEXAS L. REV. 251(1954).
"Weisenberger v. Lone Star Gas Co., 257 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1953), error dismissed (water heater); McConnell v. Frost, 45 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Waco 1932), error ref. (cyclorama hung on wall); Mogul Prod. & Ref. Co. v. Southern
Engine & Pump Co., 244 S.W. 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1922) (removable rotary
pumps); Taylor v. Lee, 139 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1911) (mirrors and
chandeliers). But see Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co., 249 F. 513 (5th Cir. 1918);
Glueck & Co. v. Powell, 227 Mo. App. 1226, 61 S.W.2d 406 (1933).
78 Ruby v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 358 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1962); Crabb v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Co., 177 S.W.2d 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1944), error ref.
" A few cases have suggested that severability is the ultimate test, notably Mundine v.
Pauls, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 46, 66 S.W. 254 (1902). See also Ruby v. Cambridge Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 358 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962). Such a rule would eliminate
the preference lien given by TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (Supp. 1972) which
requires proof of severability. By proving his right to the preference the claimant would
prove he is entitled to no lien. See text accompanying note 251 infra.
"Campbell v. Teeple, 273 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925).81TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9 (1968).82Id. § 9.104(10). Id. § 9.313 provides that a security interest cannot be created in
"goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass,
metal work and the like . . . unless the structure remains personal property" but prescribes
rules of priority for other fixtures.83Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563 (1892).
84National Bank v. Coleman, 151 S.W. 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1912), error ref.
8"Rice Common School Dist. No. 2 v. Oil City Iron Works, 180 S.W. 1121 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1915).
88Peterson v. Stolz, 269 S.W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1925), error ref.
"See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472(a) (Supp. 1972), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 285-88 infra.
8 See id. art. 5160 (1958), discussed in text accompanying notes 289-96 infra.
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Once established, a mechanic's lien attaches to the improvement being con-
structed or repaired and the "lot or lots of land necessarily connected there-
with."" The statutory phrase refers to a tract of land treated as one parcel,
regardless of the number of lots or improvements on the parcel." If the land
is located outside a city, town, or village the lien includes up to fifty acres of
land on which the improvement is situated.9' If the lien is for construction or
repair of a railroad, it extends to all of the railroad's properties."
Nature of "rContract" Required. The labor or material must be furnished pur-
suant to a contract with the owner or his agent, trustee, receiver, contractor,
or subcontractor." If the lien is to attach to property other than marital home-
stead property, the contract may be written or oral, 4 express or implied.' But
a lien cannot be attached to the homestead of a married person unless the
work is being done pursuant to a written contract which has been signed by
both the husband and the wife before the labor was performed or the material
was furnished, and the contract must be recorded in the county clerk's office."
A subcontractor may perfect his lien with respect to homestead property if the
contract between the original contractor and the owner has been signed and
recorded in accordance with these requirements.
Although the statute requires a contract with the owner, it may not be
necessary that such owner hold the legal title at the time the laborer or
materialman contracts with him in order to entitle the claimant to a lien. A
purchaser under an executory contract of sale or other prospective purchaser,
is not an owner if the sale is not consummated prior to performance.' Never-
theless, many cases have held that a contract with one who obtains title after
its making, but prior to performance, is a contract with an owner." However,
it has been held by the supreme court that, for purposes of determining pri-
orities, the "inception" of a lien cannot relate back to the date of a contract
"Id. art. 5452 (Supp. 1972).
8°Guaranty Say., Loan & Inv. Co. v. Cash, 99 Tex. 555, 91 S.W. 781 (1906).
"mTEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5458 (1958).9 2 
Id.
" Id. art. 5452 (Supp. 1972).
"Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929); Ferguson v. Ashbell & Simp-
son, 53 Tex. 245 (1880).
"Tenison v. Hagendorn, 155 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913) (contract im-
plied where owner knew work was for his benefit, suggested changes, and supervised work);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, § 2e (Supp. 1972) defines an "original contract"
as "an agreement to which an owner is a party, either directly or by implication of law."
(Emphasis added.)
"TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5460 (Supp. 1972). A failure to comply with for-
malities before work on a contract has begun defeats the lien for all work done on that
contract, even if formalities are completed before the performance of the specific work for
which the lien is claimed. Kepley v. Zachry, 131 Tex. 554, 116 S.W.2d 699 (1938). How-
ever, a lien was held to attach to extras performed on homestead property pursuant to oral
change orders in Collins v. Hall, 161 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942), error
ref. W.O.M.
" Galveston Exhibition Ass'n v. Perkins, 80 Tex. 62, 15 S.W. 633 (1891); McCallen
v. Mogul Prod. & Ref. Co., 257 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923), error dis-
missed; Faber v. Muir, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 27, 64 S.W. 938 (1901), error ref.
"See, e.g., Enlow v. Brown, 357 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962); Newman
v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1958); see Annot., 52 A.L.R. 693
(1928).
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with one who is not the owner at the time of the contract, even if title is ac-
quired prior to performance by the claimant."
To support a lien, the ownership need not be of the entire title in fee. For
example, a lien may be enforced against a leasehold interest." But the land-
lord's interest in the property cannot be subjected to a lien without his con-
sent."' Hence, a contract with a lessee will not provide a basis for a lien on
fixtures in the absence of authority from the owner.' Circumstances, however,
may lead to the conclusion that the owner has ratified a contract between his
tenant and the mechanic's lien claimant. For example, if the tenant is given
limited authority to contract for improvements and the landlord, with know-
ledge, fails to repudiate a contract which exceeds that authority, the tenant may
be deemed the landlord's agent by ratification.' But, in Campbell v. Teeple'"
and Sheer v. Cummings,' it was held that an owner's mere knowledge that
the contractor is making improvements under a contract with a tenant does
not amount to ratification by the owner, if the owner did not authorize any
improvements. Moreover, a requirement in a lease that the tenant make im-
provements which revert to the owner has been held not to amount to a con-
sent by the owner to the establishment of a lien for materials furnished in the
construction of such tenant improvements. "
Perfecting the Lien. A cornerstone principle of Texas mechanic's lien law is
that so long as the owner complies with his statutory responsibilities to retain
funds from the contractor, his aggregate liability, and that of his property, to
contractors and subcontractors is limited to the amount of the price of the
original contract." ' Thus, the owner is enabled to control his maximum lia-
bility regardless of the number of subcontractors his original contractor em-
ploys or the extent to which the original contractor becomes indebted to them.
In Texas, unlike many states,0 " only an original contractor enjoys a direct
lien on the property; the subcontractor must rely on his statutory rights to col-
lect funds due from the owner to his contractor.' Consequently, once the
owner has paid the full price to his original contractor, if he has complied
"0Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971). See also
Hubert Lumber Co. v. King, 468 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 1971),
error ref. n.r.e.; National W. Life Ins. Co. v. Acreman, 415 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1967), af/'d, in part, on other grounds, 425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968).
'"Sumrall v. Russell, 255 S.W. 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1923), error dismissed;
Ogburn Gravel Co. v. Watson Co., 190 S.W. 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1916), af/'d
on other grounds, 110 Tex. 161, 217 S.W. 373 (1917).
lat Penfield v. Harris, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 659, 27 S.W. 762 (1894), error ref.
""Grube v. Nick's No. 2, 278 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1955), error ref.
n.r.e.; Eardley Bros. v. Burt, 182 S.W. 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916); Ham-
mond v. Martin, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 570, 40 S.W. 347 (1897), error ref.
'William Cameron & Co. v. Gibson, 278 S.W. 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925),
error ref.
14272 S.W. 299, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925).
' 80 Tex. 294, 16 S.W. 37 (1891).
'"Sumrall v. Russell, 255 S.W. 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1923), error dismissed;
Cleburne St. Ry. v. Barber, 180 S.W. 1176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1914), error ref.
10'See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
"0 Several states give the subcontractor a direct lien. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
51-601 (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-2-2, 61-2-6 (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 42,
143 (1951).
'09TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Supp. 1972). See also, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 254, S 4 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. 5 43-7 (1950).
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with the statutes in doing so, no subcontractor can subject his property to a
lien. It is, therefore, vital to a subcontractor's interest that the owner be con-
strained not to pay all of his contract price to the original contractor before
the subcontractor has been paid. A great part of the verbiage in our lien
statutes is calculated to induce the owner to retain funds for unpaid subcon-
tractors by withholding them from the original contractor."
Two additional principles contribute to the appalling verbosity of our lien-
perfecting procedures: (1) the owner and third parties must have reasonable
notice of a mechanic's lien on the property, and (2) the owner and the con-
tractor must have prompt notice of the accrual of unpaid subcontractor claims
which may ripen into liens on the real estate. The former principle is fulfilled
by the recorded sworn claim of lien; the latter, by the requirement that sub-
contractors send periodic statements of unpaid debts. Unfortunately, in effect-
uating these requirements the legislature has created a labyrinth of techni-
calities. It has been suggested that the average subcontractor could as easily
interpret the Internal Revenue Code as determine his duties by reading the
Hardeman Act."'
The Lien Affidavit."' Every original contractor, to perfect his lien, must file a
lien affidavit with the county clerk within 120 days after the indebtedness
accrues; subcontractors are required to file the affidavit within 90 days after
the accrual of indebtedness. Every claimant must also send two copies of the
affidavit to the owner by certified or registered mail addressed to his last known
business or residence address. By filing the affidavit within the prescribed time
and sending the requisite copies to the owner, the original contractor has per-
fected his lien; there is no additional requirement imposed upon him. But the
subcontractor, in addition to filing the lien affidavit, must furnish various
notices to the owner and, in some circumstances, to the original contractor."
13
The form of the mechanic's lien affidavit is not prescribed by the statute,
but article 5455 sets forth certain requisites:
(1) The affidavit must be a sworn statement containing a jurat;"' a mere
acknowledgment is insufficient."1' Moreover, an acknowledgment
is not required in order to make the instrument recordable."'
(2) If known, the name of the owner or reputed owner must be shown."'
(3) It must contain a general statement of the kind of work done or
materials furnished or specially fabricated, or both. Customary sym-
bols and abbreviations are sufficient."'
(4) It must state the name of the employer of the claimant, or to whom
10 See TEX. REV. Civ. STAr. ANN. art. 5463, 5469 (Supp. 1972), and discussion ac-
companying notes 144-80 infra.
". Baker, The New Mechanics' & Materialmen's Lien Law, 26 TEx. B.J. 1009 (1963).
"2TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, S 1 (Supp. 1972).
". Id. art. 5453, § 2.
.. Id. art. 5455.
"'Crockett v. Sampson, 439 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
11. Wood v. Barnes, 420 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"' If title to the property has passed since performance, one should show the former
owner's name as well as the current owner. Prudence dictates that every person holding title
from date of performance to filing be set forth.
".. Prior to the 1961 revisions strict itemization was required. This change was one of
the better accomplishments of the Hardeman Act. See Woodward, supra note 6.
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the claimant furnished the material, and the name of the original
contractor.
(5) It must contain a description of the property sought to be charged
with the lien which is "legally sufficient" for identification."9
(6) It must be signed by the claimant or by someone on his behalf. An
assignor may execute an affidavit after assignment or he may
authorize his assignee to execute it."'
The affidavit must be filed with the clerk of the county in which the real
estate is situated within a stated period of time following the time that "the
indebtedness accrues."' Article 5467 sets forth the alternative events which
constitute accrual of indebtedness in specific circumstances. Before the 1961
amendments, this article was simpler.' Under the present statute"' the event
which produces debt accrual depends upon the kind of work a laborer is
performing or the type of materials which the materialman is contributing.
Furthermore, the revision deleted a provision permitting the parties to agree
upon a date for the accrual of indebtedness. It is perhaps no longer possible
for the parties to set their own debt accrual date for the purpose of starting
the time periods for filing the lien affidavit.' Under the current statute, in
by far the majority of cases, accrual of indebtedness is deemed to be on the
tenth of the month next following the month in which a specified event
occurs."'
Subcontractor Notice for Labor or Materials Furnished. Where the claim
is for labor or materials actually furnished, the notice required is a periodic
notice of the unpaid balance owed the claimant for his labor or materials. A
subcontractor claiming on a debt owed by the original contractor for labor
done or materials delivered must send such notice to the owner within ninety
days after the tenth of the month next following the month of performance."'
If a subcontractor's contract is neither with the owner nor the original con-
tractor, he has two notices to send: one notice to the owner, as just described,
and one to the original contractor. The time for sending notice to the original
"' TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5455 (Supp. 1972). A complete lot-and-block or
metes-and-bounds description is "legally sufficient." A house number coupled with a descrip-
tion of streets and premises bounding it was held sufficient in Gillespie v. Remington, 66
Tex. 108, 18 S.W. 338 (1886). The objective is to require a description from which the
land may be certainly identified from all others. Rheem Accept. Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d
353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959), eror rel. n.r.e.
'"Wortham v. Trane Co., 432 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1968).
"'TEx. RE. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, § 1 (Supp. 1972).
"2sCh. 98, S 15, [1889] Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1142 (1898),
quoted in text accompanying note 35 supra.
"'3TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5467 (Supp. 1972).
" Baker, supra note 111.
"' TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5467 (Supp, 1972). For the original contractor
and for all claimants seeking retainages, it is the tenth of the month next following the
month in which the original contract was completed, finally settled, or abandoned. For the
subcontractor who furnished labor or materials, it is the tenth of the month next following
the last month in which he performed. If the claim is for "specially fabricated material"
which was never delivered, the indebtedness accrues on the tenth of the month next follow-
ing the month in which delivery would normally have been required at the job site. If the
claim is for wages, and the claimant is on an hourly, daily, or weekly wage, the debt accrues
at the end of the calendar week in which the labor was performed.
'"1d. art. 5453, § 2b(2).
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contractor also begins to run on the tenth of the month, but he has only thirty-
six days after the tenth (rather than ninety days) to send such notice."7
It is important to remember that the time periods for sending the pre-
scribed notices begin running from each month in which materials are de-'
livered or labor is performed. Typically, a claimant will send several sets of
notices in connection with a single job or contract.'
There is no prescribed form for notice of materials or labor furnished. A
copy of the regular statement or billing is sufficient, but when sent to the
owner, it must contain a warning that, if the bill remains unpaid, the owner
may be personally liable and his property subjected to a lien unless he with-
holds funds to pay the subcontractor."9 Article 5453 specifically provides that
the statutory warning is necessary if the notice is to be effective to "trap funds."
It does not say that the warning is necessary in order to perfect the lien, nor
that it is necessary other than when a subcontractor is noticing by using a state-
ment or billing in the customary form. Nonetheless, in Trinity Universal In-
surance Co. v. Palmer"' the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals held that if
a warning is not given, the notice is inadequate to perfect the lien. In Hunt
Developers, Inc. v. Western Steel Co."' the Corpus Christi court, only a year
before, had held that the warning is not necessary to perfect a lien qualifying
a claimant for statutory retainage."' In view of the conflict in the cases, it
seems prudent to include the warning to the owner in every notice for material
or labor furnished."'
Subcontractor Notice for Specially Fabricated Material. To perfect a lien on
undelivered specially fabricated materials, the materialman must have sent
notice of his acceptance of a contract to fabricate the materials to the owner
(and to the original contractor, if the materialman is not in privity with
him)." The time for sending such notice to either the owner or the original
contractor begins to run from the date of the acceptance, and he is given only
thirty-six days from the tenth of the month following the month of such ac-
ceptance to send it. But once the specially fabricated materials are actually de-
.. Id. § 2b(1). Prior to the Hardeman Act, notice to the original contractor was not
required, a fact which sometimes resulted in a contractor's paying twice for the same ma-
terial. See Wilson v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 110 Tex. 156, 217 S.W. 372 (1919); W.L.
MacAtee & Sons v. House, 137 Tex. 259, 153 S.W.2d 460 (1941).
.2. This requirement is a substantial burden to the subcontractor and should be revised.
See text accompanying notes 302, 303 infra.
"9Tx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, § 2b (Supp. 1972).
120412 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
11409 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966).
"'See text accompanying note 180 infra.
"' The warning is dearly not required in notices to be given for undelivered specially
fabricated materials or with respect to retainage agreements. Perhaps the holdings of the
two courts can be reconciled by ascribing a different meaning to the injunction, "send notices
in the time and manner required by this act," contained in art. 5469, and the requirement
of art. 5472d that a claim must be perfected "in the manner prescribed for fixing and se-
curing a lien by Article 5453," but such distinction would appear to be merely semantic
and not substantive. On the face of it, the Hunt case probably reached the correct statutory
construction. But one may well ponder why the legislature saw fit to restrict the warning
requirement to the isolated circumstances described in the proviso. If there are valid policy
reasons to ensure that unsophisticated owners be advised of the consequences of their failure
to retain funds, why not require the warning in every notice as a prerequisite to recovery
of statutory retainage, as well as funds withheld pursuant to art. 5463?
14 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, § 2c (Supp. 1972).
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livered, notice of the unpaid balances must be given to the owner and to the
original contractor in the usual way. Even if the materials are never delivered,
the materialman must give the prescribed notices which he would have other-
wise given had he delivered the materials. The time for that notice begins to
run from the date delivery would normally have been required under his con-
tract with the subcontractor or contractor. '
The notice given to perfect a lien on undelivered fabricated material must
contain (1) a statement that an order has been received and accepted, (2) a
description of the material, and (3) the price of the material. The form of
notice given after such materials are actually delivered or when delivery
would normally have been required is the same as for notice of delivery of
ordinary materials.
Subcontractor Notice of Retainage Agreement. An optional method of sub-
contractor notice is available to those claimants who have made agreements
whereby they are to receive payment for their labor, materials, or specially
fabricated materials at some date after the expiration of the month immedi-
ately following the month of their performance."" Such payments are defined
in article 54 52.2(g) as "retainage.""' 7 Materials which are sold on a sixty-
or ninety-day account fall into this category.
If notice of a retainage agreement is given to the owner (and to the
original contractor if the agreement is with a subcontractor) within thirty-
six days after the tenth of the month next following the month in which
the agreement is made, no further notices of any kind are required to be given
for labor or materials which are allocable to the retainage agreement. 1 8 Such
notice relieves the subcontractor of the burden of sending periodic notices
over an extended period as labor and materials are furnished.13"
A substantial limitation on the desirability of relying on this form of notice
is that its receipt by the owner does not authorize him to withhold funds
from the original contractor. Authorization to withhold comes only with receipt
of the lien affidavit, when this is the sole method of notice utilized by the
subcontractor.' 0 Fortunately, the statute permits a subcontractor having a re-
tainage agreement to give the regular notices for labor or material actually
delivered in lieu of, or in addition to, the optional notice."'
Notice of a retainage agreement must state that retention of funds has been
agreed upon between the claimant and the original contractor or subcontractor;
135 Id.
136 Id. S 2a.
"3 Retainage as referred to in this Act (other than the statutory retainage pre-
scribed by Article 5469) is defined as any amount representing any part of
the contract payment or payments which are not required to be paid to the
claimant within the month next following each month in which the labor
was performed, or material furnished or both; or specially fabricated ma-
terial was delivered.
Id. art. 5452, § 2(g).
38 Id. art. 5453, § 2a.
119 Subcontractor notices under art. 5453, § 2b must be given with respect to each month
of performance.
'
4 0 Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5463, 5 la (Supp. 1972).
"I Id. art. 5453, S 2a.
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the sum to be retained; the due date or dates, if known; and the general
nature of the agreement."
Delivery of Notices. Article 5456 is a welcome addition made by the Harde-
man Act; it specifically sets forth the events which constitute the giving of
notice. If a lien affidavit or subcontractor notice is in the proper form and
mailed by certified or registered mail, it is deemed to have been given at the
time it is deposited in the United States mails. If any other method of delivery
is used, the notice is deemed to have been given only when it is actually re-
ceived."
Eflect of Subcontractor Notice. As previously stated, a subcontractor enjoys
no automatic, direct lien on the owner's property by virtue of his compliance
with the lien-perfecting procedures. The subcontractor's rights are lost after the
original contractor has been paid in full, provided that in so paying the con-
tractor the owner has not violated a statutory injunction to withhold funds
from the contractor. But if the owner fails to comply with the statutory re-
quirements for retention of funds, a penalty lien is given to the subcontractor
against the owner's property.'"
Article 5463 requires an owner to withhold funds due from him to the
original contractor on receipt of a subcontractor notice given after the actual
delivery of materials." The owner must thereafter withhold sufficient funds
to pay all claims properly noticed, limited to the amount of the original con-
tract price minus all sums paid prior to receipt of the notice." This statute is
often referred to as the "fund-trapping" statute because it lends to the notice
the effect of trapping or impounding undisbursed funds in the hands of the
owner. The notice works like a writ of garnishment; the owner is personally
liable and his property subjected to a lien to the extent of funds which he pays
to the original contractor in violation of the requirements of article 5463'
When the owner has retained funds under the fund-trapping statute, he
must pay the noticing subcontractor's claim out of those funds, if sufficient to
do so, on proper written demand from the subcontractor. The demand must be
sent to the owner with a copy to the original contractor. If the contractor fails,
within thirty days after receipt of the demand, to send notice to the owner that





14'ld. art. 5456. However, if the applicable statutory provision requires receipt, the notice
cannot be deemed given when mailed. See, e.g., id. arts. 5454, 5463.
14 See id. arts. 5463, 5469.
145 Note that the owner's obligation to withhold funds cannot be imposed prior to re-
ceipt of the notice. Consequently, a notice may be effective to perfect the lien if mailed in
proper form within the prescribed time period and yet fail to trap funds which are paid
after mailing, but prior to receipt of the notice.
146 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5463, § lc (Supp. 1972) provides that the funds
are to be retained "unless payment is made under Article 5455, or the claim otherwise set-
tled or determined, until the time for securing a lien under this Act has passed; or if a
lien affidavit has been filed, until the lien claim has been satisfied and released."
141 Lonergan v. San Antonio Trust Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061 (1907); W & W
Floor Covering Co. v. Project Accept. Co., 412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967);
First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 194 S.W. 1146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1917), aff'd, 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919).
14TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5454 (Supp. 1972).
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The subcontractor may make written demand for payment only after he
"shall have given written notice to the owner that his claim or any portion
thereof, either has accrued under the terms of Article 5467 or is past due
according to the agreement between the parties.""' Taken literally, this pro-
vision imposes a notice requirement in addition to that of article 5453. A
statement or billing may be sufficient notice to perfect the lien, and yet not
state affirmatively that the debt has "accrued" or is "past due." However, since
article 5454 specifically permits the demand to "accompany the original notice
of nonpayment or of a past due claim" or to be "stamped or written on the
face of said notice," as well as subsequently given, the requirement is not overly
burdensome. " ' Better practice would be to state in the subcontractor notice and
in the written demand that the debt has accrued under article 5467 or is past
due by agreement of the parties."'
Article 5469, like the fund-trapping statute, imposes a withholding require-
ment on the owner; he must retain in his hands a fund equal to ten percent of
the original contract price, or its value, during the progress of the work and
for thirty days after its completion. This fund is commonly referred to as
"statutory retainage" because it arises by operation of law and not solely
upon receipt of a subcontractor notice."'
Article 5469 was enacted in 1909 in form similar to the current statute,
with two important exceptions. The original statute made the fund retained
inure to the sole benefit of artisans and mechanics." The Hardeman Act, while
conferring a preference to the fund on artisans and mechanics, earmarked the
residue for all other subcontractors. In addition, the Hardeman Act imposed
the requirement that to be entitled to statutory retainage the claimant must file
his lien affidavit within thirty days after completion of the work."
The significance of these changes may be measured by the fact that in over
fifty years only one reported case construed the old statute,"' while the Harde-
man Act revision has produced more than a dozen cases in a single decade."'
This plethora of litigation is largely attributable to the almost universal cus-
tom, at least on smaller jobs, of paying the contractor in full on or before
completion of the work." Prior to the Hardeman Act few disputes arose
because few artisans and mechanics were denied payment for their labor, and
fewer still were prone to invoke their lien rights. The infrequent invocation
of the statute coupled with the preeminent necessity of satisfying the contrac-
tor's demand for payment led to a wholesale disregard of statutory retainage
requirements. Under the revision, these requirements can no longer be ignored.
1401d.
150 id.
"' The reference in TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5454 (Supp. 1972) that the notice
may state that the debt is past due by agreement of the parties suggests that the parties
may set their own debt-accrual date, even though such provision was stricken from art. 5467.
See notes 123, 124 supra, and accompanying text.
..' It is so referred to parenthetically in TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, S 2g
(Supp. 1972). See note 137 supra.
15 Ch. 103, § 1, £1909] Tex. Laws 184.
154 Tx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
"' Miller v. Harmon, 46 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932); see Woodward,
supra note 6.
""See Annotations, TBx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
.. See Woodward, supra note 6, at 490-91.
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Now that every subcontractor has a right to statutory retainage, article 5469
has virtually eclipsed the fund-trapping statute in significance to the average
subcontractor.
The owner, then, must beware of paying his contractor in full until thirty
days have expired after completion of the work, and he should pay him at that
time only if there are no unpaid subcontractors who have filed lien affidavits.'58
The subcontractor seeking a share of the statutory retainage fund must take
care to file his lien affidavit before the thirty days have expired. Sole reliance
on the ninety-day period given by article 5453 for perfecting the lien may
prove to be fatal to the claim.
If the owner withholds the' statutory retainage fund, all unpaid claimants
who send proper, timely subcontractor notices and file their lien affidavits
within thirty days after completion of their work, have a ratable lien on the
fund, artisans and mechanics having a preference lien over other claimants.
If the owner fails to withhold the fund, all claimants who perfect liens in the
manner prescribed by article 5453... share ratably (with a preference ratably
among artisans and mechanics) in a lien on the owner's property, "at least to
the extent of the.., fund of ten per cent (10%) which should have been
retained."'' 0 Thus, if the owner defaults in his responsibilities, the subcon-
tractor's failure to file his lien affidavit within thirty days of completion will
not prejudice his claim.
Article 5469 does not by its terms impose personal liability on the owner
independent of a lien for failure to abide by its provisions. But in W & W
Floor Covering Co. v. Project Acceptance Co."6 1 the Austin Court of Civil
Appeals found such personal liability implicit in the statutory admonition that,
after judgment on a subcontractor claim, "the owner shall be required to pay
... any money he is required to retain by the provisions of Article 5469 . 1..2.""'
In W & W Floor Covering the owner entered into a mechanic's lien con-
tract with a contractor for construction of a homestead residence. Proper
formalities were undertaken for establishing a lien on homestead property, " '
but prior to the performance of any work the owner gave a negotiable note
for the full contract price secured by the contract, and the contractor assigned
his note and lien to Project Acceptance Co., a holder in due course, as security
for his construction loan.'" W & W Floor Covering Co. was engaged by the
158 The statutory retainage statute does not specify the length of time during which the
owner is required to retain the funds if an affidavit has been filed. The procedures for pay-
ing on demand pursuant to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5454 (Supp. 1972) do not
apply to statutory retainage. It would appear that he should retain the funds until the claim
is settled or until the lien claim has been satisfied and released. See id. art. 5463, § 1c.
"
9 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972) extends the benefits of the
penalty lien to "all claimants complying with the provisions of this Act." The lien is per-
fected under art. 5453 if the lien affidavit is filed within 90 days of debt accrual (irrespec-
tive of the time elapsed between completion of the building and filing). The supreme court
in General Air Conditioning Co. v. Third Ward Church of Christ, 426 S.W.2d 541 (Tex.
1968), held that a claimant for statutory retainage need only have complied with the notice
requirements of article 5453 if the owner defaults in his responsibility.
6 0 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
1r1412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967).
'
6 2
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5463 (Supp. 1972).
6See text accompanying note 96 supra.
"'The financing device used in this case is extremely common. It is the rule, rather
than the exception, in financing residential dwellings.
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contractor during the progress of the work to install carpet and lay tile, but
after performance by W & W the contractor abandoned the work, leaving
W & W unpaid for its labor and materials. W & W sent the required notices
and filed its lien affidavit in compliance with statutory requirements and sued
to foreclose its lien.
Payment in full by a negotiable note which is assigned to a holder in due
course constitutes full payment to a contractor and thus extinguishes his lien
rights. Payment in full also forecloses the rights of subcontractors under the
fund-trapping statute, since every notice will be too late to require withhold-
ing. Moreover, the derivative claimant can have no first lien rights under article
5469, because the lien rights of the holder in due course are for the full pay-
ment price and are paramount,' " and a subcontractor can have no lien on
homestead property derived from the contractor's compliance with homestead
formalities if the contractor's lien is extinguished.1"
Relying primarily on the language of article 5463 the court held that, al-
though no lien rights could be obtained by the subcontractor, the owner was
personally liable to him to the extent of the ten percent fund which should
have been retained. The case elects perhaps the more equitable escape from the
dilemma created by our statutory scheme, but it marks the demise of a long
tradition that an owner should have no personal liability for non-compliance
with the statutes independent of a lien. "7
Another traditional concept was cast in doubt by Lennox Industries, Inc. v.
Phi Kappa Sigma Educational & Building Ass'n"' In that case the contractor
abandoned the project prior to completion, and the owner was forced to com-
plete the project at his own expense. His costs, plus sums already paid the
original contractor, exceeded the original contract price, and his contract
provided that in such event he was not required to pay further sums to the
contractor. In defending against claims by subcontractors who sent proper
notices and filed timely lien affidavits after the contractor's abandonment, the
owner invoked a rule traditionally applied under the fund-trapping statute:
that where his contract so provides, the owner is entitled to use funds in his
hands to complete the project after abandonment, and that, since he ex-
pended more than the original contract price, his liability and that of his
property to derivative claimants is extinguished. "' But the court read article
5469 to require the ten percent withholding even though it results in the
owner being liable for a sum greater than the original contract price and
'" The assignee of the note who qualifies as a holder in due course is also a holder in
due course of the lien because the attributes of negotiability in the note are imparted to
the lien. Continental Nat'l Bank v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948). See
Note, Mechanics' Liens: Statutory Retainage Versus Holder in Due Course, 22 Sw. L.J.
500 (1968).
" McCutcheon v. Union Mercantile Co., 267 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1954), error ref.
1.7 See note 31 supra, and accompanying text. For an elaborate discussion of W & W
Floor Covering and the issues it raises, see Note, supra note 165.
108430 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968).
'"'Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061 (1907);
Dudley v. Jones, 77 Tex. 69, 14 S.W. 335 (1890); Fullenwider v. Longmoor, 73 Tex. 480,
11 S.W. 500 (1889).
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held that the contractor's abandonment did not relieve him of that responsi-
bility.
170
The balancing of interests required to arrive at a just result in the factual
contest of the Lennox case is a delicate one. Should the subcontractor or the
owner bear the loss resulting from the contractor's default? If the owner can-
not utilize funds withheld, he may not be able to continue the project. On the
other hand, if the owner had withheld ten percent at all times during the
progress of the work, he theoretically should be holding ten percent of the
monies actually earned by the contractor at the time of abandonment and his
loss should, therefore, be limited to the expenses resulting from a substitution
of personnel. Furthermore, the owner chose to deal with the contractor in a
complex, intimate contractual relationship and perhaps should be held to a
higher duty of care than the subcontractor, who is often a mere vendor of
merchandise. Finally, an owner could protect himself entirely by requiring a
payment bond of his contractor pursuant to article 5472d."' While doing some
violence to a traditional principle, the Lennox court seems to have reached
an equitable result in construing article 5469.
As previously mentioned, article 5469 requires the owner to withhold "ten
per cent ( 10% ) of the contract price to the owner... or ten per cent ( 10% )
of the value of same" until thirty days "after the work is completed." Where
an owner enters into a single, turnkey contract for the erection of a building
with one original contractor, the statute is not difficult to interpret. If the price
of the building is $100,000, he is bound to retain a total of $10,000 for the
benefit of subcontractors for at least thirty days after all work is completed on
the building. But suppose the owner acts as his own general contractor and
makes three separate original contracts-with a foundation contractor for $25,-
000, a shell home builder for $60,000, and a roofer for $15,000. Assume
further that the foundation contractor defaults in his obligations to his sub-
contractors, whereas the other two original contractors pay their bills in full.
How much should the owner retain and for how long? Do the terms "contract
price to the owner" and "work" refer separately to each original contract, so
that subcontractors of the foundation contractor have a claim for only $2,500
(10% x $25,000) which the owner need retain no longer than thirty days
after completion of the foundation work? Or, do such terms refer to the
aggregate of all three original contracts, so that $10,000 (10% x $100,000)
must be retained for thirty days after completion of the entire building? Two
courts of civil appeals split on this issue,17 but a five-to-four majority of the
supreme court in Hayek v. Western Steel Co. 7" interpreted the statute to re-
quire the owner to retain ten percent of the price of all original contracts or
"7 The court held that the authorities cited in note 169 supra were irrelevant since
they were decided prior to the Hardeman Act change. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5469 (Supp. 1972). The Lennox Industries case was overruled sub silentio on other grounds
in Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972). See text accompanying notes
172, 173 infra.
171 See part IV infra.
172 Lennox Indus., Inc. v. Phi Kappa Sigma Educ. & Bldg. Ass'n, 430 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1968) (contract price refers to each original contract separately); Hunt
Developers, Inc. v. Western Steel Co., 409 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1966) (contract price refers to the aggregate price or value of the entire structure).173478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972).
19721
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of the value of the building for thirty days after completion of the structure.
The majority's rationale in Hayek was relatively straightforward. The court
noted that prior to the 1961 amendments, article 5469 set forth the required
amount of statutory retainage to be "ten per cent of the contract price of such
building, fixture or improvement, or the repair thereof, or ten per cent of the
value of such building, fixture or improvement, or the repair thereof .... 1"
It observed that although the Hardeman Act changed the wording to "ten per
cent (10%) of the contract price to the owner ... of such work, or ten per
cent (10%) of the value of same,"1" the term "work" is further defined by
article 5452, as amended by the Hardeman Act, as "any construction or repair
referred to in paragraph 1" thereof, namely, of a "building, house, or improve-
ment." Reading these statutes together, the court refused to infer a legislative
intent to change the impact of the earlier provision. To hold otherwise, argued
the majority, would produce a discriminatory fragmentation of the retainage
fund.
The dissent lined up with the view of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals'7"
that by referring to "contract price to the owner, ' '"1 the legislature intended
that each original contract should control its own retainage fund, and that the
term "work" as defined in article 5452 merely referred to construction or repair
of the improvement contemplated by a single original contract. Irrespective of
the merits of its view of the legislative intent, the dissent clearly pointed out
a yet unsolved dilemma raised by the majority's opinion:
[E)ither (1) the owner will be required to pay more than the total of the
contractual obligations incurred by him for the construction of the improve-
ment, or (2) original contractors who fully perform and pay their bills will
ultimately receive less than the amounts stipulated in their contracts with the
owner.'
78
In the hypothetical situation, the owner would be required to retain ten percent
of each of the three contracts (a total of $10,000.00), and the subcontractors
of the defaulting foundation contractor would be entitled to have their claims
paid from that fund. If their claims should exceed the foundation contractor's
share of the retainage ($2,500.00), who should bear the resulting loss?
If the owner is obligated to return the retainage allocable to the other con-
tracts, is not that a violation of the principle that the owner who complies with
his statutory duties cannot be required to pay more than the contract price?'"
On the other hand, must the two innocent contractors suffer a loss of their
earnings, perhaps their entire profit margin, because of the default of a con-
tractor with whom the owner freely chose to deal, but with whom they have
no privity of contract? On purely equitable grounds, it would seem to be the
owner who should bear the risk. He is in the best position to minimize the
loss by using a turnkey contractor, by requiring periodic proofs of payment to
'
74 Ch. 103, §§ 1-4, [1909) Tex. Laws 184.
75 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
17Lennox Indus., Inc. v. Phi Kappa Sigma Educ. & Bldg. Ass'n, 430 S.W.2d 404
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968).
'7TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
1.. Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786, 796 (Tex. 1972).
""
9 See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
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subcontractors, or by exacting a payment bond from the original contractors
as authorized by article 5472d.
There is some confusion as to the requisite form of subcontractor notices
capable of perfecting an article 5469 claim. That statute requires that in
order to qualify for statutory retainage a claimant must, in addition to filing a
timely affidavit, "send notices in the time and manner required by this Act."
It is not clear whether the warning required by article 5453 is necessary to
perfect a statutory lien. "' Until this conflict is resolved, every subcontractor
notice for labor performed or materials actually delivered should contain the
warning.
The Trust Fund Statute. The unpaid subcontractor is often in a rather pre-
carious position, waiting for money to trickle down to him from the owner
or from the original contractor, but in 1967 the legislature gave him a little
more muscle. Article 5472e, enacted that year,' provides that all monies or
funds paid to a contractor or subcontractor under a construction contract and
all construction funds borrowed by the contractor, subcontractor, or owner con-
stitute trust funds for the benefit of contractors and subcontractors. The statute
makes a misapplication of these trust funds "with intent to defraud," punish-
able by fine or imprisonment. 8' The act does not apply to any lender, title
company, or closing agent, and the Texas Trust Act is made inapplicable."'
So far there has been only one reported case construing this statute. In
Owens v. Drywall & Acoustical Supply Corp."4 funds unpaid but due to a
contractor from an owner were held not subject to a levy of a lien for federal
taxes due the contractor, since they were trust funds held by the owner for
the benefit of employee-laborers of the contractor. It remains to be seen
whether this provision will measurably improve the mechanic's lien claimant's
chances of collecting his receivables. Conceivably, it can be interpreted to im-
pose personal liability on original contractors and owners for debts to con-
tractors and subcontractors, to the extent of misapplied funds, even though
the claimant may have failed to perfect his statutory lien.
83
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIEN
Article XVI, section 37 of the Texas Constitution created a mechanic's lien
which exists and is enforceable independently of the statutory provisions." It
'See notes 129-33 supra, and accompanying text.
181 Ch. 323, §§ 1-8, [1967] Tex. Laws 770.
182 Misapplication of less than $250 of the trust funds is made punishable by imprison-
ment in jail for not more than two years and by a fine of not more than $500, or by im-
prisonment alone. Misapplication of $250 or more of the trust funds is punishable by
confinement in the Department of Corrections for not more than ten years. TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e, S 2 (1967).
' Id. S5 4, 7.
58325 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
185TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Supp. 1972) was undoubtedly enacted for
the purpose of discouraging contractors from engaging in the customary practice of paying
the last job's expenses with the next job's financing. Cf. Owens v. Drywall & Accoustical
Supply Corp., 325 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Tex. 1971). In Owens it was noted that the statute
had been enacted "seemingly to supplement the existing remedies available to laborers
and materialmen . . . . [and] the Court should strive for a broad construction in order
to 'effectuate its protective purposes."' Id. at 400.
8' See text of constitution in note 20 supra.
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has long been held that, as between the owner and the contractor, the consti-
tutional lien is "self-executing."'8" Accordingly, unlike the statutory lien, it is
not conditioned on compliance with the requirement that a lien affidavit be
filed with the county clerk and sent to the owner; it exists by operation of law.
But not every claimant is entitled to the constitutional lien. He must be in
direct contractual privity with the owner of the realty or his agent, i.e., an
original contractor; subcontractors do not qualify.' However, it would seem
that if the apparent original contractor is deemed to be a "sham contractor"
pursuant to article 5451-1, the technical subcontractor will be entitled to the
constitutional lien."9
The great Achilles' heel of the constitutional lien is that it cannot be en-
forced against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice."' Accordingly, if
a claimant does not file the statutory lien affidavit, he may easily come out last
in a contest for lien priority. But if there are no intervening purchasers or
encumbrancers without notice, the contractor is free to enforce his constitu-
tional lien in the same manner as a statutory lien. There is authority that
actual notice or knowledge of the presence of materials or construction at the
job site is sufficient to put third parties on inquiry and, thus, is the equivalent
of notice."'
As is the case with the statutory lien, marital homestead property cannot
be subjected to forced sale unless the work and materials have been contracted
for in a writing signed by the husband and wife and recorded with the county
clerk," and the constitutional lien will not attach to public buildings or struc-
tures erected on public ground."'
The constitutional lien is given only for work on an "article" or "building,"
and its application is thus more limited than the statutory lien."' When the
17 Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l
Bank v. Taylor, 40 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
"'Horan v. Frank, 51 Tex. 401 (1879); First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co.,
194 S.W. 1146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1917), aff'd, 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133
(1919); cf. Berry v. McAdams, 93 Tex. 431, 55 S.W. 1112 (1900). To qualify for the
constitutional lien the original contractor must be a mechanic, artisan, or materialman. The
terms "mechanic" and "artisan" are defined in Warner Memorial Univ. v. Ritenour, 56
S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933), error ref. "Materialman" is defined in
Huddleston v. Nislar, 72 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934), error ref. A
laborer for a daily wage was held not to qualify for a constitutional lien for current wages
in McQuerry v. Glenn, 1 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1927), error dismissed.
A subcontractor who did no more than supervise other laborers was held not to be a
mechanic or artisan in Mood v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 300 S.W. 30 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1927), holding approved.
"' See note .54 supra. Article 5452-1 should be applicable to the constitutional lien as
well as the statutory lien, pursuant to the delegation of authority contained in the consti-
tutional provision. See note 20 supra.
"'First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 194 S.W. 1146 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1917), afl'd, 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919).
"' See Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 40 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897);
Wood v. Barnes, 420 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967), error ref. n.r.e.; New-
man v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1958); Hill v. Praetorians,
219 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1949), error ref. n.r.e.
"'TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5460 (Supp. 1972).
See note 96 supra, and accompanying text.
1"Peterson v. Stolz, 269 S.W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1925), error ref.; see
notes 83-88 supra, and accompanying text.
I" Activities which have been held not to constitute construction or repair of a "building"
or "article" include: setting an oil well casing in place (Oil Field Salvage Co. v. Simon,
140 Tex. 456, 168 S.W.2d 848 (1943); Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063
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lien attaches to a "building" or other fixture, it includes so much of the land on
which it is situated as may be necessary for its enjoyment."5
Primarily, the constitutional lien is useful as a "back-up system" in the event
the original contractor fails to comply with the technicalities of the Hardeman
Act. Obviously, anyone entitled to the constitutional lien is also entitled to per-
fect a statutory lien. The careful practitioner will attempt to perfect a statutory
lien whenever possible.
III. PRIORITIES
A. The General Rule
The general rule of lien priorities is embodied in the maxim "first in time,
first in right." Where no special statutory preference is applicable, mechanics'
liens are accorded priority in accordance with the chronological order of their
attachment to the realty relative to other encumbrances.'"
Article 5459, section 11"7 is the starting point for any discussion of mechanic's
lien priorities. Enacted in its present form in 1889,'"8 this statute accords a pre-
ference lien to mechanics' liens on severable improvements over prior en-
cumbrances on the land or such improvements.' " In addition, it has provided
the impetus for the rule that, for purposes of determining its chronological
ranking with other liens, a perfected mechanic's lien "relates back" to an
earlier date, namely "the inception of the lien." '
(1929)); repairing a grave washed away by a flood (Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v.
Operators Oil & Gas Co., 37 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931), error dis-
missed); erecting a fence (In re Wigzell, 7 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. Tex. 1933). However,
if the fence is appurtenant to a house built under the same contract, the lien may attach.
See Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896)); installing sewer lines and water
mains (Campbell v. City of Dallas, 120 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1938),
error ref.); building a road (National W. Life Ins. Co. v. Acreman, 415 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967), aff'd in part, modified in Part, 425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968) );
and slotting a water well casing (Eoff v. Skinner, 244 S.W.2d 991 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1952)). Activities which qualify as construction or repair of a "building" or
"article" include: the construction of a pier anchored on dry land and permanently affixed
over water by means of steel pipes (Ambrose & Co. v. Hutchinson, 356 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962)); constructing a sidewalk in front of a building (Waples-
Platter Co. v. Ross, 141 S.W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1911), rev'd on other
grounds, 107 Tex. 215, 176 S.W. 47 (1915)); furnishing ice and refrigeration machinery
which is bolted to a building (Reeves v. New York Eng. & Supply Co., 249 F. 513 (5th
Cir. 1918)); and installing vinyl tile firmly glued to a house (Enlow v. Brown, 357
S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962)).
9' Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896); Bryant-Link Co. v. W.H.
Norris Lumber Co., 61 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933), error dismissed.
1 Hammann v. H.J. McMullen & Co., 122 Tex. 476, 62 S.W.2d 59 (1933).
'
5 7 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 1 (Supp. 1972).
'
95 Ch. 98, §§ 1-20, [1889) Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1138 (1898).
1 A general discussion of the degree of severability which gives rise to the preference
lien on improvements is undertaken in notes 237-51 infra, and accompanying text.
"The relation-back rule had its origin in the case of Trammell v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210,
4 S.W. 377 (1887), which was decided at a time when the priority statute contained the
words "accrual of the lien" in place of the phrase "inception of the lien." In that case
the supreme court held that although the mechanic's lien is not perfected until a proper
filing is accomplished, when perfected the lien relates back to the time when the materials
were furnished or labor performed. As discussed in text accompanying notes 201-05 infra,
the seemingly innocuous one-word amendment of 1889 led the court in Oriental Hotel Co.
v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1896), to impute a legislative intent to change
the result of Trammell and hold that the lien related back to the time of the making of
the contract. During the period between inception and perfection of the lien, every person
dealing with the property is charged with notice of the existence of the lien, irrespective of
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In the landmark case of Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, '1 the supreme court
considered for the first time what is meant by the statutory phrase "the incep-
tion of the lien."' In that case, the Oriental Hotel Company, owner of a city
block in Dallas, having had the excavation work done and the foundation for
a hotel building laid, entered into a contract with Griffiths on February 24,
1890, to complete a hotel building on the property. On May 1, 1890, the hotel
company executed a deed of trust to the hotel property for its mortgagee,
St. Louis Trust Company, which was duly recorded. After the hotel was com-
pleted, Griffiths and certain contractors who had made and performed con-
tracts with the owner after recordation of the deed of trust, sought to fore-
close their liens. The mortgagee opposed the claims of priority urged by the
contractors, other than Griffiths, on the ground that their liens attached on the
dates of their performance and thus after the recordation of its deed of trust."03
But the supreme court held that the two contractors' liens related back to the
date of Griffiths' contract, and thus had priority over the deed of trust lien,
primarily because of its interpretation of the word "inception":
The word 'inception' means 'initial stage'. . . . It does not refer to a state of
actual existence, but to a condition of things or circumstances from which the
thing may develop. When the building has been projected, and construc-
tion of it entered upon,--that is, contracted for,-the circumstances exist out
of which all future contracts for labor and material necessary to its completion
may arise, and for all such labor and material a common lien is given by the
statute; and in this state of circumstances the lien to secure each has its 'in-
ception.' "
Subsequent cases reasserted the holding of Oriental Hotel that a materialman's
lien has its inception in the contract for the erection of the improvement."'
For seventy-five years there was widespread confusion as to the essential
nature of the contract required by Oriental Hotel for the operation of its
relation-back rule: (1) whether the rule applied only where there was a
general turnkey contract, or if it also applied where the contract was for only
a part of the work;' 0 (2) whether the rule required a contract for construction,
as opposed to a mere supply contract;..7 (3) whether the contract could be
actual notice. Keating Implement & Mach. Co. v. Marshall Elec. Light & Power Co., 74
Tex. 605, 12 S.W. 489 (1889).
20188 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1896).
202TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 1 (Supp. 1972).
20 Of course, the mortgagee relied principally on Trammell v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210,
4 S.W. 377 (1887), discussed in note 200 supra.2
1 Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 583-84, 33 S.W. 652, 662 (1896).
205 See, e.g., University Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287,
295 (Tex. 1967); Sullivan v. Texas Briquette & Coal Co., 94 Tex. 541, 63 S.W. 307
(1901).
201 Compare McConnell v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280 (1957),
and Pierce v. Mays, 277 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954), -modified on other
grounds, 154 Tex. 487, 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955), with University Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1967), and Investors' Syndicate v. Dallas
Plumbing Co., 61 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933).
"' Compare Martin v. Texas Briquette & Coal Co., 77 S.W. 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903),
a/I'd on other grounds, 98 Tex. 80, 81 S.W. 1 (1904), with Security Lumber Co. v.
Weighard Constr. Co., 413 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana), a/I'd on other
grounds, 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1967).
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oral as well as written;... (4) whether it was required that the contract be
with the holder of legal title to the real estate, as opposed to a contract with
a mere prospective purchaser who later obtained title;"8 and (5) whether
a claimant may relate his lien back to an original contract other than that
under which his work was performed.21
These questions arose again and again, especially in the typical priority con-
test between a materialman and a lender-mortgagee claiming under a deed of
trust. Assume, for example, the following fact situation: (1) The developer,
intending to erect a dwelling, executes a contract for the purchase of Black-
acre with the seller on June 1. (2) Prior to the closing, the developer makes
an oral contract with X contractor for the construction of a dwelling founda-
tion on Blackacre; he then contracts with Y contractor for the house framing;
and, thereafter, he contracts with Z contractor for the roofing. (3) The de-
veloper arranges a loan from the mortgagee to finance both the cost of the
land ($10,000) and the cost of construction of the dwelling ($25,000).
(4) On July 1, at a closing, the developer takes a deed to Blackacre from the
seller, and the mortgagee loans $35,000 to the developer ($10,000 of which
goes to the seller and $25,000 of which goes to the developer for construction
costs), the loan being evidenced by a note secured by subrogation to the
seller's vendor's lien and a lien created by a deed of trust with a power of
sale which was that day recorded. (5) On July 15, Y contractor begins the
construction of the house framing on Blackacre, furnishing labor and materials
throughout the months of July and August pursuant to his contract. (6) On
October 1, Y contractor, having received no payment for his work, files his
statutory lien affidavit to perfect his mechanic's lien. (7) The developer be-
comes insolvent and defaults on his contract with Y contractor and on his note
and deed of trust with the mortgagee. (8) On November 1, the mortgagee
forecloses its deed of trust by exercising its power of sale, and subsequently
Y contractor brings suit to enforce its mechanic's lien. The resolution of the
ensuing priority contest rests on a determination of the issue: When did the
lien of Y contractor have its "inception"?
This fact situation is essentially that of Irving Lumber Co. v. AlItex Mort-
gage Co., 1' decided by the supreme court on May 12, 1971. This landmark
decision and the legislation it engendered put to rest most of the questions
left in doubt following Oriental Hotel.
Irving Lumber Company (Y contractor) argued that its lien had its in-
ception on the date of its contract with the developer and that its lien was
therefore superior to the lien thereafter created by Alltex's (the mortgagee's)
deed of trust. While the lumber company conceded that the $10,000 vendor's
208Newman v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. Ap.-Amarillo 1958); Investors'
Syndicate v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 61 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933).
209 Sprowls v. Youngblood, 23 SW.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929), rev'd
on other grounds sub noma. Harveson v. Youngblood, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1931), holding approved; Breckenridge City Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W. 875 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1923); McCallen v. Mogul Prod. & Ref. Co., 257 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Galveston 1923), error dismissed w.o.j.; Schultze v. Alamo Ice & Brewing Co., 21 S.W.
160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
21Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1896). See Comment,
Priority of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 872 (1962).
211468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
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lien to which Alltex was subrogated was superior to its lien, it contended that
the lien created by the deed of trust, not the vendor's lien, was foreclosed by
the power of sale given by the deed of trust."' Alltex urged that the lumber
company's lien had its inception only when construction was undertaken
subsequent to the recordation of the deed of trust. It further contended that
the sale under the deed of trust foreclosed its vendor's lien as well as its deed
of trust lien, and being superior, thus extinguished the "junior" lien of the
lumber company."'
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for
the mortgagee,"1 4 holding that Irving Lumber Company could not relate its
lien back to the date of its contract with the developer because (1) the con-
tract was not a "general" contract, (2) construction had not commenced at
the job site, and (3) the developer was not the holder of legal title to the
property at the time the contract was made. The date of the "inception" of its
mechanic's lien was held to be the date Irving Lumber Company undertook
construction, and, thus, after the recordation of the deed of trust.212 The court
further held that the sale under the power created by the deed of trust fore-
closed the prior vendor's lien to which Alltex was subrogated and, therefore,
extinguished the "junior" lien of Irving Lumber Company.2
The supreme court, in an opinion dated February 2, 197 1,217 unanimously
reversed the court of civil appeals on all grounds, holding that the inception
of the lumber company's lien occurred on the date of its contract and, thus,
prior to the liens created by the deed of trust, and that the foreclosure under
the power of sale did not extinguish the lumber company's liens. However, on
motion for rehearing, the court withdrew that decision and issued a new
opinion affirming the court of civil appeals.2 ' The opinion on rehearing was
based on the rationale that Alltex held a superior title to the extent of the
purchase money it lent; the superior title was secured by the deed of trust;
and foreclosure of the superior title by the sale under the deed of trust cut
off the lumber company's lien."9 The court further concluded that "the priority
of a security interest is not determined on the date of the 'inception' of an
22 Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error, Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage
Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
213 Respondent's Reply to Application for Writ of Error, Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex
Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
214 Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1969), aff'd, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
21 Since it rejected the contract as the "inception," the court was relegated to the rule
of Trammell v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210, 4 S.W. 377 (1887). See note 200 supra.
2"- The court never addressed itself to the question whether the sale under the deed of
trust actually foreclosed the prior vendor's lien or whether it foreclosed a separate contract
lien, given in part for purchase money, which was created by the deed of trust. See notes
257, 258 infra, and accompanying text.
11714 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (1971).
218Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
219 The title of these lots passed to [the developer) burdened by the deed of trust
and security interest of Alltex in the same manner as if the prior owner had
conveyed a partial interest before [developer] acquired its ownership in the
lots. At least to the extent of the purchase money advanced, a superior title
was held by Alltex. That superior title was secured by the deed of trust, and
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agreement between the contractor and a prospective owner." ' Nonetheless,
the majority did not disturb its earlier conclusion that a lien may relate back
to a contract which is oral and for construction of only a part of a building,
and thus not "general.
2 2 1
Following the first opinion, there was widespread unrest among mortgage
lenders and title companies in Texas. Although it had been well established
since Oriental Hotel that a written, general contract with an owner would pro-
vide the inception of a mechanic's lien, the prospect of having piecemeal, oral,
executory contracts give rise to secret, inchoate liens prior to the beginning of
any construction on the real estate was deemed a commercially unacceptable
risk. The task of the lender seeking to assure itself of a first lien position prior
to advancing funds seemed impossible.
Accordingly, a bill"2 was introduced in the Texas Senate which was destined
to settle seventy-five years of ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "in-
ception of the lien." The emergency clause of the bill referred to the "prob-
lems and confusion created by the Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in
the case of Irving Lumber Company v. Alltex Mortgage Company."' Ulti-
mately, it became section 2 of article 5459, executed into law by the Governor
on May 17, 1971, and effective from the date of its passage."'
The new amendment provides that the "inception" of a mechanic's lien
shall be the earliest to occur of three events: (1) the commencement of
visible construction or delivery of materials which are visible on the job site;12
(2) the recordation of a written agreement for the construction of improve-
ments or any part of the improvements or a written agreement to perform
labor, furnish material, or provide specially fabricated material; or (3) if
there is no written contract, the recordation of an affidavit stating that the
claimant has entered into an oral contract. Thus, if a claimant wishes to have
the inception of his lien occur prior to the date work has begun or materials
have been delivered at the job site, he must give constructive notice of his
contract by filing the contract itself with the county clerk, if it is a written
contract, or by filing an affidavit describing the contract, if it is merely an
oral contract.
The new statute should prove a welcome addition for mortgage bankers
and title insurors. For the first time in Texas it is possible to ascertain routinely,
and with reasonable certainty, at any given time whether inchoate mechanics'
liens exist with reference to a tract of land. Mechanic's lien claimants may take
pleasure in the fact that the statute codified the favorable holdings of the ill-
fated original opinion of the Supreme Court in Irving Lumber." Thus, the
statute clearly sanctions relation-back to any contract, whether it is general or
220 Id. at 343.
2 21 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 212.
2
1
2 S.B. 733 was introduced in Feb. 1971. Ch. 231, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 1082.
2N3 Id.224 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, S 2 (Supp. 1972)
22" There is always a modicum of uncertainty involved in ascertaining whether construc-
tion of improvements or delivery of materials has commenced, particularly if the improve-
ments constitute additions to other structures. Note, however, that 5 2a requires the com-
mencement of construction or delivery of materials to be "actually visible from inspection
of the land." Id. § 2a.
22 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (1971); see text accompanying note 221 supra.
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special, whether for construction of a building or merely for the delivery of
materials, and whether written or oral. But the new amendment is not without
shortcomings from the claimant's point of view. For example, the require-
ment under section 2(b) that the written contract itself be recorded may be
burdensome in the extreme, both financially and logistically; an affidavit could
have served as well.2 ' Furthermore, preparing an affidavit containing the
information required is itself a formidable task for busy, unsophisticated con-
tractors and subcontractors. The likely result is that only the more affluent,
sophisticated contractors will routinely take advantage of the opportunity to
establish an early lien. The vast majority of workmen and materialmen may
effectively be divested of the legacy of Oriental Hotel.
One irregularity in part 2(c) of article 5459 clearly seems to have been
unintentional, but it may create a problem. The entire section contemplates
that a mere supply contract has the same force as a contract for construction
of improvements insofar as providing the inception of the mechanic's lien.
Yet, the affidavit is required to state that the oral contract is "for construction
of improvements." ' This ambiguity undoubtedly crept into the statute when
the proposed bill was redrafted. When first introduced and sent to the judiciary
committee, it permitted only a contract for, or the beginning of, construction to
provide the inception of the lien.2 ' However, in response to suggestions from
materialman groups, the statute was changed to provide that the lien should
also have its inception when materials had been delivered and, on proper
recordation, when there was an agreement to perform any part of the con-
struction, to perform labor, to furnish materials, or to specially fabricate
material. Appropriate language was inserted in sections 2(b) and 2(c) to
include these additions to the list of agreements which qualified, but the draft-
ers of the bill failed to insert the additions in the description of the form of
affidavit required in section 2 (c). Surely this was an inadvertent error, and not
intended to imply that relation back to an oral contract is permitted only where
the contract is for construction of improvements.
The amendment may also be criticized for certain unfortunate omissions.
First, the statute fails to clear up an age-old ambiguity and declare whether each
contractor's lien relates back to the date of his own contract or the date of the
first contract for construction applicable to the building. It is not clear whether
a subcontractor's lien relates back to the date of his own contract, the original
contract from which his lien is derived, or the first contract applicable to the
building." ° Oriental Hotel would seem to indicate that all original contractors
and all subcontractors on a project may relate their liens back to the date of
the first contract which contemplates the construction of the building.2 '
Recently, one court of civil appeals, in its initial opinion on facts analogous to
those of Oriental Hotel, after thoroughly examining later authorities pro and
212 It is conceivable that the present statute will permit an affidavit to suffice even in
cases where a written contract exists, if the contract has been lost. Cf. Blakeney v. Nalle
& Co., 101 S.W. 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), error ref.
12Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2c (Supp. 1972).
22 Id. § 2.
230For an extensive discussion of this problem see Comment, supra note 210.
"'See text accompanying note 204 supra.
[Vol. 26
MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
con, determined that the lien of an original contractor had its inception in,
and related back to, the date of a general contract between the owner and a
prior contractor, noting that the general contract contemplated the work per-
formed by such original contractor. On rehearing, the court omitted its refer-
ence to this issue."
This result is more in keeping with the policy that lien claimants share
ratably on the same improvement." For example, in the context of the fact
situation of Irving Lumber, it would be contrary to that policy for Z contractor
(the roofer) to be subordinated to the mortgagee, while X contractor (the
foundation man) enjoys a superior lien relative to the intervening mortgage.
It seems unfair to discriminate against lien claimants who, because of the
nature of their work, customarily make contracts during the later stages of the
project. Moreover, the result of Oriental Hotel is not unfair to mortgage lenders
or purchasers, because the recordation of the contract puts the world on notice
of inchoate mechanic's lien claims which reasonably may be expected to arise
later in connection with the construction contemplated by the contract.
The second omission of the statute is its failure to make clear whether
recordation of a contract with a mere prospective owner provides the inception
of the lien. Did the amendment codify the holding of the first Irving Lumber
opinion in this respect, or the holding of the second opinion? A line of cases '
permitting a contract with a prospective owner to provide the inception of the
lien was approved by the supreme court in the first opinion, and the amend-
ment was drafted in final form prior to its withdrawal." Since the amendment
does not by its terms require a contract with the "owner," it seems logical to
conclude that the legislative intent was contrary to the holding of the court's
second opinion. The opposite conclusion would require a contractor to make
a title search before contracting with a developer, since it is common practice
in the industry for developers to finalize contracts with their builders before
closing a purchase of the site. On the other hand, it may be inequitable to the
mortgage lender and his title insuror to require a period of search extending
prior to the time title is acquired by the person contracting for improvements.2"
B. The Statutory Preference
Thus far, this discussion has encompassed priorities on land and improve-
ments established under the general rule, irrespective of the severability of
the improvement from the land. But section 1 of article 5459 gives to me-
chanic's lien claimants a preference lien on improvements over all prior liens
on the land, provided that such prior liens "shall not be affected thereby.
2 87
22 York Div., Borg. Warner Corp. v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 15,771 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.) May 11, 1972), opinion on rehearing, 485 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972).
23 See Comment, supra note 210.
2- See note 98 supra, and accompanying text.
m The first opinion was withdrawn and the second opinion issued on May 12, 1971,
14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 350 (1971). S.B. 733 was executed by the Governor on May 17, 1971;
the dissenting opinion was filed May 19, 1971, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 366 (1971), and re-
hearing was denied on June 9, 1971, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 388 (1971).
23See Note, Statutory Criteria for Determining the Time of Inception of Mechanics'
and Materialmen's Liens, 9 HOUsTON L. REv. 174, 180 (1971).
2
3 7TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 1 (Supp. 1972).
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The proviso has been interpreted to mean that a claimant is not entitled to
a preference lien on an improvement which is so affixed to the building or land
that its severance will result in serious injury to the realty."' When an improve-
ment can be removed without harming the remaining land or fixtures, it is
treated as if it had never become a part of the real estate and may be sold
separately." 9 The priority statute thus gives the claimant some relief in cases
where the general rule does not give him a first lien. The policy of the statute
is sound; it prevents a windfall accretion to the value of a prior mortgage
lien holder's security at the expense of the mechanic's lien claimant, but it
protects the mortgagee from a decrease in the value of the land and improve-
ments as they existed when he made the commitment to lend. 4'
It has been held that the preference extends to all severable improvements,
including improvements which the claimant never worked on or furnished."'
However, some cases have stated the applicable rule as if the priority extended
only to improvements referable to the claimant's contract.' The language
of the statute hardly suggests such a limitation, but the policy of the statute
is thwarted somewhat if a mortgagee may be divested of improvements to the
real estate made at the expense of materialmen other than the lien claimant.2"
Whether the removal and sale of a specific improvement will seriously
injure the realty is generally a question for the trier of fact." The various
criteria submitted to the jury or used by the court include whether removal
will (1) cause material damage," (2) cause a destruction of value of all
improvements,2" (3) injure the land,"7 (4) cause material detriment or
material injury, " or (5) cause serious injury and damage to the building
and lot. 9
Some courts have indicated that improvements which are severable never
become a part of the realty.2 ' It perhaps aids understanding to treat severable
improvements as if they remained personalty, but to deem them personalty
"' Cameron County Lumber Co. v. Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc., 122 Tex. 487, 62 S.W.2d
63 (1933); Hammann v. H.J. McMullen & Co., 122 Tex. 476, 62 S.W.2d 59 (1933).229Summerville v. King, 98 Tex. 332, 83 S.W. 680 (1904).240 See Woodward, sapra note 6.
*"'R.B. Spencer & Co. v. Brown, 198 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971),
error ref.; Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-Lingo Co., 104 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1937).
" See, e.g., Freed v. Bozeman, 304 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957),
error ref. n.r.e.
20 On the other hand, perhaps the statute should be interpreted literally in order to
effectuate the public policy of the state that the liens of mechanics and materialmen should
be favored. See note 299 infra, and accompanying text.
2"Occasionally, appellate courts have treated this issue as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969),
aff'd, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
24'Parkdale State Bank v. McCord, 428 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi
1968), error ref. n.r.e.
2"Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 69 S.W. 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), error ref.
2'TJ.D. McCollum Lumber Co. v. Whitfield, 59 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1933), error ref.
' Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-Lingo Co., 104 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1937).
4' Cameron County Lumber Co. v. Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc., 122 Tex. 487, 62 S.W.2d
63 (1933).
1 Summerville v. King, 98 Tex. 332, 83 S.W. 680 (1904); Freed v. Bozeman, 304
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957), error ref. n.r.e.
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renders such improvements incapable of being subjected to a mechanic's lien.
The logical result of this analysis is that a claimant who establishes facts which
give his lien a preference has ipso facto established that he is entitled to no
lien at all."'
C. Special Relationships
Priorities Against Lender-Mortgagees. The typical priority confrontation is be-
tween a mechanic's lien claimant and a lender claiming under a deed of trust
or a subrogated vendor's lien."' Some general observations as to the ground
rules operative in these confrontations may be helpful.
A vendor's lien, whether acquired by reservation or subrogation, is general-
ly superior to a mechanic's lien. A mechanic or materialman is charged with
notice of any vendor's lien even if the deed retaining the vendor's lien was
not recorded at the time of the "inception" of the mechanic's lien.' Moreover,
a claimant who contracts with a mere prospective purchaser cannot obtain
priority over a vendor's lien which encumbers the property when the title is
transferred." 4 Although the operative theory has rarely been articulated, the
result is a logical one because the vendor's lien is a part of the original owner's
title and, as such, was "on the land" at the time the mechanic's lien claimant
made his contract. Consequently, the vendor's lien is always a prior lien on
the land which is not to be affected by a subsequent mechanic's lien."'
The majority opinion of the supreme court in Irving Lumber suggested that
a lien for purchase money created by a deed of trust is to be treated as a
vendor's lien for the purposes of determining priorities." In that case a non-
judicial foreclosure of a deed-of-trust lien by exercise of the power of sale
was held to cut off the rights of lienholders which were subordinate to the
subrogated vendor's lien of the mortgagee, but not subordinate to the con-
tractual liens created by the deed of trust which he also held. The court refused
the contention that a lender who holds a subrogated vendor's lien and a deed
of trust lien, given in part to secure the same purchase money debt, is in
2 See discussion, note 79 supra. Improvements which have been held severable and
thus subject to a preference lien include: a ticket booth, a speaker stand, and a screen at a
drive-in theatre (Freed v. Bozeman, 304 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957),
error ref. n.r.e.); a partially completed structure attached to a concrete foundation (Mogul
Prod. & Ref. Co. v. Southern Engine & Pump Co., 244 S.W. 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1922)); a frame building (Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-Lingo Co., 104 S.W.2d
891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937)); and a rock house (R.B. Spencer & Co. v. Brown,
198 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917), error ref.). Improvements which have
been held non-severable include: a house (Cameron County Lumber Co. v. Al & Lloyd
Parker, Inc., 122 Tex. 487, 62 S.W.2d 63 (1933)); painting and plastering (R.B. Spencer
& Co. v. Brown, supra); roof repairs (Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 69 S.W. 86 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1902), error ref.); window frames (McCallen v. Mogul Prod. & Ref. Co., 257
S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923), error dismissed); and a shell home (Irving
Lumber Co. v. AlItex Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969),
afl'd, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971)).
2" A lender may be subrogated to the lien of an original vendor by virtue of an express
assignment of the vendor's lien or by operation of law upon his furnishing purchase money.
Harveson v. Youngblood, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931), holding approved.
2 C.D. Schamberger Lumber Co. v. Holbert, 34 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1931).
2"Harveson v. Youngblood, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931), holding
approved.
2 5 TEx. REv. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 1 (Supp. 1972).
5' 468 S.W.2d at 343.
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possession of two liens, apparently concluding that the vendor's lien is merged
into the lien created by the deed of trust and is, thus, capable of being fore-
closed by exercise of the power of non-judicial sale therein contained. ' Ac-
cordingly, a lender who loans a sum of money for land acquisition and con-
struction expenses and takes a single deed of trust to secure the aggregate debt
may achieve vendor's lien status for his entire debt and thus cut off mechanics'
liens which have their inception prior to the recordation of the deed of trust. 8
Relative Priorities Between Mechanic's Lien Claimants. Article 5468 provides
that perfected mechanics' liens are on an equal footing without reference to
the date of their filing, and the proceeds at foreclosure are paid pro rata,
except where the lien being foreclosed secures an obligation for statutory re-
tainage." 9 Article 5469 gives a preference in the statutory retainage fund to
artisans and mechanics, who share pro rata. After the debts of artisans and
mechanics are satisfied, the remainder of the fund is distributed pro rata among
other claimants. " ' All subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen have a pre-
ference over other creditors of the "principal contractor or builder" by virtue
of article 5464.
D. Enforcement of Mechanics' Liens
A mechanic's lien can be enforced only by judicial foreclosure."6 ' If the
foreclosure is on improvements and realty, proper jurisdiction is in the district
court in the county in which the land is situated." However, if the foreclosure
pertains solely to improvements and not to any real estate, the amount in con-
troversy will determine the appropriate court for the foreclosure suit." Venue
is proper in the county where the land is located. " The foreclosure may be
accomplished in a suit on the underlying debt or, afterwards, in a separate pro-
ceeding.s"
The applicable statute of limitation is that which is applicable to the
underlying indebtedness.' If the debt is evidenced by a written contract, the
257 The majority relied primarily on the case of National Western Life Ins. Co. v.
Acreman, 415 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967), afi'd in part, modified in
part, 425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968). That case held that a lien created by a deed of trust
is impressed by the character of the indebtedness for which it is given to secure and that
a lien created by a deed of trust to secure the payment of purchase money has the status
of a purchase money lien as well as a deed-of-trust lien.
258The dissenting opinion in Irving Lumber Co., 468 S.W.2d at 344, criticized this
anomaly. The majority reserved the question whether the mechanic's lien claimant could
pursue in the hands of the mortgagee that portion of the proceeds at the sale which is
attributable to the loan of construction funds.
210 It is important to note that ratable sharing in funds withheld under the fund-trapping
statute takes place only between claimants on the same plane of diligence. If an owner
receives a subcontractor notice from one or more claimants and retains only enough to pay
them, forwarding the rest of the funds to the original contractor, a subcontractor noticing
the owner at a later date cannot share in the funds withheld. A payment by the owner
of excess funds after receipt of a notice closes the class. Rotsky v. Kelsey Lumber Co., 118
Tex. 180, 228 S.W. 558 (1921).260TEx. REV. Cir. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
261Pratt v. Tudor, 14 Tex. 37 (1855).212 Gillespie v. Remington, 66 Tex. 108, 18 S.W. 338 (1886).
26 5McConnell v. Frost, 45 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931), error ref.
04TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 12 (1963).265 Cf. Maupin v. Chaney, 139 Tex. 426, 163 S.W.2d 380 (1942).
2"6 University Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1967).
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four-year statute applies;26 if the claimant performed under an oral contract,
the two-year statute applies. "8
When foreclosing a mechanic's lien, it is necessary to join every party who
may have a claim against the property. No person is bound by a foreclosure
decree unless he is made a party.' Proper parties include the owner, the
original contractor, the claimant's debtor, and all other lien claimants. The
owner is considered an indispensable party."'
IV. BOND CLAIMS
No treatment of the subject of mechanics' liens is complete without a dis-
cussion of the means of perfecting claims against statutory payment bonds.
Even if he is conditioned to follow the complicated routine for perfecting his
mechanic's lien, a claimant could find himself unsecured after furnishing labor
or material for a public improvement or a bonded private project if he is
unfamiliar with the requirements necessary to establish and enforce a claim
against a payment bond permitted or required by Texas law.
A. Bonds on Private Improvements
Bond To Pay Liens or Claims. There are two kinds of bonds which may be
filed with respect to a private improvement. The first of these is referred to as
a "Bond to Pay Liens or Claims," and would normally be filed before work
commences on a project. When properly filed, the bond prevents any mechanic's
lien from arising which would encumber the owner's property. This type of
bond is permitted, but not required, to be filed by the original contractor if
(1) there is a written contract between the owner and the original contractor;
(2) the bond is in a sum not less than the total of the original contract price;
(3) it is written by an authorized corporate surety conditioned on prompt
payment for all labor and materials plus extras not to exceed fifteen percent;
(4) the approval of the owner is endorsed on the bond; and (5) the bond is
filed with the county clerk together with the written contract to which it per-
271tains.
After the bond is filed, mechanics' liens cannot be fixed against the realty
or improvements, and the owner, as well as mortgagees or purchasers, may
deal with the property as if there were no claims of unpaid subcontractors.
Subcontractors are relegated to claims on the bond, and the owner is relieved
of all obligations to retain funds or to pay undisputed claims, which would
normally accrue to him under the mechanic's lien statutes; no subcontractor
suits may be brought against him.2 *
There are two alternative procedures for perfecting a claim under a Bond
to Pay Liens or Claims. First, a subcontractor may simply follow the require-
ments for perfecting his statutory lien. Thus, whether or not he knows that a
2 67TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (1958).
2'ld. art. 5526.
211 Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895).
270 See Adams & Wickes v. Cook, 55 Tex. 161 (1881); Atkinson v. Jackson Bros., 259
S.W. 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).




bond exists, his rights are secured by simply following the normal, familiar
procedure for perfecting a mechanic's lien. In the alternative, his bond claim
can be perfected by following the appropriate notice requirements applicable
to perfecting a statutory mechanic's lien, with the exceptions that the owner's
notices must be sent to the surety and he does not have to give notice for
specially fabricated materials. Following the latter method relieves the sub-
contractor of the burden of filing the lien affidavit. " "
The matter of enforcing a claim against a payment bond is different in
some important respects from enforcing a mechanic's lien. Suit on the Bond
to Pay Liens or Claims cannot be brought until sixty days have elapsed after
the claim has been perfected."7 4 Moreover, the statutes of limitations applicable
to contracts are not controlling. The claimant must file a suit on a Bond to Pay
Liens or Claims within fourteen months after his claim is perfected." An im-
portant advantage from the subcontractor's point of view is that court costs
and attorney's fees may be recovered against the bond." A mechanic's lien
cannot be asserted as security for the payment of attorney's fees.2"
Bond To Indemnify Against Liens. Existing lien claims may be disposed of by
a "Bond to Indemnify Against Liens" authorized by article 5472c. It is per-
mitted, but not required, to be filed by an owner, an original contractor, or
a subcontractor for the purpose of releasing perfected mechanic's lien claims.
The bond must be made in a sum double the amount of the claim and must
refer to the specific claims involved. It must be written by an authorized cor-
porate surety and made payable to the specified lien claimants, conditioned on
their lien claims being adjudicated. "
When this type of bond is filed with the county clerk, he is required to
serve notice on each of the claimants named in the bond. Those persons
receiving notice have thirty days in which to file suit to judicially foreclose
their mechanics' liens; if they fail to do so, they are relegated to an action on
the bond. '" Suit on the bond may be brought not less than thirty days nor
more than one year after service of the notice is received." '
B. Bonds and Liens with Respect to Public Improvements
It has long been held that a mechanic's lien cannot be established on any
27
3 Id. § 4.
274 Pursuant to the statute, proper venue lies in the county where the bond was recorded.
The contractor must be joined in a suit against the surety except under special circumstances.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1987 (1964). Jurisdiction depends on the amount
in controversy. Cf. The Morris Plan Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 387 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1965).
272TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472d, § 6 (Supp. 1972).
27 Attorney's fees are not recoverable against the general contractor and owner in the
absence of an agreement to pay such fees, but reasonable attorney's fees are recoverable
against the surety bond irrespective of an agreement. University State Bank v. Gifford-Hill
Concrete Corp., 431 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e.;
see note 280 infra, and accompanying text.
-""American Sur. Co. v. Stuart, 151 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941).
278 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472c, S 1 (1958).
""'Nixon Constr. Co. v. Rosales, 437 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969),
error ref. n.r.e.
2 Reasonable attorney's fees are recoverable either in a suit upon the lien or upon
the bond. TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472c, § 4a (1958).
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public building, structure, or grounds."1 The subcontractor's security on a
public project, therefore, is limited to a statutory lien on funds payable under
certain small contracts, "" or a claim against a mandatory payment bond on
larger contracts.2"
Lien on Funds Due Under Contracts for $2,000 or Less. Article 5472a pro-
vides a lien for a subcontractor who furnishes labor or materials to a con-
tractor under a prime contract "8 with the State of Texas or a subdivision
thereof where the amount of the contract is $2,000 or less. He may perfect a
lien on any monies, bonds, or warrants which become due under the prime
contract with the public agency."'
To perfect this lien the subcontractor must send notice of his claim to the
official having the duty to pay the prime contractor. The notice must be sent
within thirty days after the tenth of the month next following the month of
performance, by certified or registered mail, with a copy to the prime con-
tractor. It must state (1) the amount claimed, (2) the name of the party for
whom the materials were delivered or the labor performed, (3) the dates and
places of delivery or performance, (4) the work done, (5) the amount due,
(6) the project where the materials were delivered or the labor performed,
and (7) under oath, that "the amount claimed is just and correct and that all
payments, lawful offsets and credits known to the affiant have been allowed."'
Upon receipt of a proper notice, the public official is required to retain the
funds until the subcontractor's right to a lien has been judicially established.'"
Article 5472b-1 provides that when such lien is perfected, the funds owing
to the prime contractor may be released by his furnishing a bond for double
the amount of the perfected lien claims. The lien claimant is then relegated
to a suit on the bond, which must be brought within six months after the bond
has been filed. "8'
Bond on Public Improvements-The McGregor Act. The McGregor Act "
is a comprehensive statute governing mandatory bonding requirements for
the benefit of subcontractors of a contractor having an improvement contract
281 See notes 83-88 supra, and accompanying text.
282 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472a (Supp. 1972).
2183 Id. art. 5160 (1971).
284 There appears to be no difference in meaning between the term "prime" contract
and "original" contract. See note 290 infra.
285TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472a (Supp. 1972).286 Id.
287 1d. art. 5472b (1958).1111d. art. 5472b-1.
28 1d. art. 5160 (1971) (originally enacted as ch. 93, §5 1-5, [1959] Tex. Laws 155).
This Act was a comprehensive amendment to ch. 99, [1913] Tex. Laws 185. The emergency
clause of the Act stated its purpose:
The fact that contractors on public works have suffered enormous losses by
virtue of having made regular and timely payments to subcontractors, who in
turn fail to pay their suppliers and subcontractors from funds, thus received,
on running account in lieu of applying said payments to and for the account
of work for which the payment bond is to be made, and the fact that the
provisions of the Act are necessary to provide simple direct methods of giving
notice and perfecting claims of laborers, materialmen, and subcontractors of
all classes ....
Ch. 93, S 5, [1959] Tex. Laws 155, 160.
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in excess of $2,000 with any subdivision of the State of Texas or any govern-
mental or quasi-governmental authority which is authorized by law to enter
into contractual agreements for construction or repair of a public building or
public work. ° The bond must be at least for the amount of the contract."'
Perfecting a McGregor Act claim requires that notices in proper form be
sent by certified or registered mail to the appropriate parties within prescribed
time limits."'
Every McGregor Act claimant must, within ninety days after the tenth
of the month next following the month when his labor or material is furnished,
send written notice of his claim and a sworn account to the prime contractor
and the surety on the bond. The sworn statement of account must state that
the amount claimed is correct and that all payments and credits known to the
affiant have been allowed. The statement should also state the amount of
retainage, if any, not yet due. If the work was not performed on a written
contract, the notice must include the name of the claimant's employer, the
date of performance or delivery, a description of the labor or materials and
prices therefor, an itemization of the claim, and copies of invoices or orders
showing reasonable identification of the job and the destination of any ma-
terials delivered. If a written contract exists, it may be attached to the notice
in lieu of reciting the pertinent data which would have been required had no
contract existed. If a written unit price agreement is in existence it also may
be attached, together with a list of units and prices and a statement of those
units completed and those uncompleted.29
In addition, every claimant having a contract which provides for "retainage"
(i.e., an amount not required to be paid in the month next following the
month of performance or delivery) must send to the prime contractor and
surety, within ninety days of completion of the contract, a notice of any re-
tainage called for by such contract. The notice must indicate the amount of
contractual retainage, the amount paid, and the balance due.'
Additional requirements are applicable only to claimants other than a wage
claimant for labor performed and a claimant having a direct contractual re-
lationship with the prime contractor. Such other claimants must send, by
20o Such contractor is referred to in the McGregor Act as a "prime contractor." The
term is analogous to the term "original" contractor, as defined in TEx. Ray. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5452, 5 2e (Supp. 1972).
"'Id. art. 5160, § A(b) (1971).
2Read literally, the statute makes ineffective a notice sent by regular mail (instead
of certified or registered mail) regardless of when it was received. Unlike article 5456 of
the Hardeman Act, the McGregor Act does not specify that the method of delivering notice
is immaterial if it is actually received. However, the material portions of the McGregor
Act have been taken from the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (1970) ), including
the requirement that notices be sent by registered mail (id. § 270b), and the Miller Act
requirement has long been construed to be for the purpose of assuring receipt of the
notice, and not to make registered mail a mandatory method of delivery so as to deny
rights to a subcontractor who has caused the notice to be actually received during the
prescribed period. Fleisher Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Hallenbeck, 311
U.S. 15 (1940). In this connection it has only recently been clearly established that notice
by certified or registered mail under the McGregor Act is deemed to have been given
when mailed. Johnson Serv. Co. v. Climate Control Contractors, Inc., 478 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1972).
2"'TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160, 5 B(a) (1971).
"" Id. § B(c).
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certified or registered mail, to the prime contractor a notice of the unpaid bal-
ance due him for labor furnished or materials delivered. This notice must be
sent within thirty-six days after the tenth of the month next following the
month in which any labor or materials were furnished, and, as is the case
under the mechanic's lien statutes, this provision may entail several periodic
notices on a single job. In addition, if the claimant has a retainage agreement,
notice thereof must be given to the prime contractor within thirty-six days
after the tenth of the month next following the month of performance or
delivery. If the claim is for undelivered specially fabricated materials, notice
must be given to the prime contractor within forty-five days after receipt and
acceptance of an order. 9'
An unpaid subcontractor may bring suit on a McGregor Act bond only
after sixty days have elapsed following the date he has perfected his claim.
Suit must be brought within one year and sixty days after such date.'"
V. CONCLUSION
Mechanics' liens, being in derogation of the common law,"' were created
in the State of Texas for the purpose of fostering growth through improve-
ments to real estate."8 The need for capital improvements led to a public
policy favoring liens for workmen and materialmen which found ample ex-
pression in the constitution, in the statutes, and in countless opinions of our
appellate courts.'" The viability of this purpose, policy, and need in the
modern world is rarely questioned.
It is obvious, however, that in providing liens for workmen and material-
men the legitimate interests of other groups, such as owners, lender-mort-
gagees, title insurers, and third-party purchasers, cannot be disregarded. Just
as important, neither the rights of general contractors nor subcontractors
should be exalted over the other. In order to develop the ideal mechanic's lien
law, these antagonistic interests must be melded into a statutory scheme which
serves the underlying purpose, policy, and need, yet keeps to an absolute mini-
mum the resulting deprivations to all parties concerned.
Historically, because of the nature of the legislative process, our melding
has produced an imperfect blend. First one group, then another, has held the
balance of power necessary to effect changes in the statutes and thus shift
the advantage in its favor. The result has been a long series of patchwork
amendments which manifest the give and take of interest groups locked in
a power struggle rather than the original purpose and policy of the law.
Endless compromises have resulted in detail, detail, and more detail, the sheer
complexity of which is counterproductive to both purpose and policy. These
295 Id. § B (b).
296 Id. § G. A 1969 amendment specifically provided for recovery of reasonable attorney's
fees. Ch. 422, § 1, [1969] Tex. Laws 1390. It had previously been held that such fees were
not recoverable in a McGregor Act suit in the absence of an agreement with respect thereto.
Graham Constr. Co. v. Walker Process Equip., Inc., 422 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1967), error ref. n.r.e.297 See note 2 supra.
290 Cf. note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
299 See, e.g., Warren Elevator Mfg. Co. v. Maverick, 88 Tex. 489, 30 S.W. 437 (1895);
William Cameron & Co. v. Trueheart, 165 S.W. 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1914).
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statutes must be simplified in order to accomplish the goals which they were
originally designed to achieve.
In particular, the requirements for perfecting the subcontractor's lien are in
need of revision. The demands of owners, lenders, and general contractors have
made the statutory gauntlet too rigorous for the average subcontractor. It has
been this writer's experience that fewer than fifty percent of unpaid subcon-
tractor claims are secured by a properly perfected lien, usually because of a
failure to send notices promptly enough or in proper form. Often such failure
occurs despite strenuous attempts to understand and comply with the formali-
ties of the Hardeman Act.
If we are truly committed to the policy and purpose which mechanics' liens
were created to fulfill, we should be striving to free the lien-perfecting process
from unnecessary formalities. Ideally, the lien should be given to every work-
man or materialman, whether an original contractor or subcontractor, by
operation of law, without formalities of any kind. This could be accomplished
by according the benefits of the constitutional lien to all mechanic's lien
claimants and expanding its scope to include construction or repair of any
improvement to real estate whatsoever. Unfortunately, a suggestion by Pro-
fessor Woodward that the range of the constitutional lien be extended'"' went
unheeded by the drafters of the Hardeman Act.
Of course, some form of notice requirement is inescapable to protect those
third parties who can intelligently direct their affairs only with knowledge of
the workman's or materialman's claim, e.g., title insurers, bona fide purchasers,
and lender-mortgagees. Presently, knowledge of the claim is imputed from the
time of visible construction or delivery of materials on the premises,"' but the
lien affidavit is required to be filed within prescribed time periods in order
to afford reasonable constructive notice of particularities to all third parties.
The affidavit requirement is reasonable and should be retained as a requirement
for asserting the lien against third parties without actual notice, but it can be
improved.
The Hardeman Act did a good job of simplifying the form of affidavit re-
quired, but it perpetuated some old problems. First, it continued the require-
ment that subcontractors file their affidavits a month earlier than original con-
tractors, relative to the date the indebtedness accrues. Moreover, it doubled
the task of ascertaining the filing period by vastly complicating the criteria for
determining when indebtedness accrues."'
Standardizing the time periods for filing the affidavit would be a substantial
improvement. Both original contractors and subcontractors alike could be re-
quired to file the affidavit within ninety days of debt accrual. An even better
formula would be to require the affidavit to be filed on the tenth of the month
next following the expiration of ninety days after the date indebtedness accrues.
In this manner, workmen and materialmen will be conditioned regularly to
perfect unpaid claims prior to the tenth of every month. Under the present
30 0Woodward, supra note 6.
"o Keating Implement & Mach. Co. v. Marshall Elec. Light & Power Co., 74 Tex. 605,
12 S.W. 489 (1889).
so, See text preceding note 113.
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system, the time period begins on the tenth' but the last day for filing may
fall on the eighth, ninth, or eleventh of the month, depending on which month
is involved. In this connection, "accrual of indebtedness" for both categories of
claimant could well be simplified to mean merely the date of last per-
formance."'
One other formality of article 5453, 5 1 should be modified. That statute
requires two copies of the affidavit to be sent to the owner. 5 Presumably, one
copy will not do, and the copies must be sent by certified or registered mail
(or received) prior to the expiration of the filing period. It would seem that
the benefit to the owner does not warrant the rigidity of this requirement. It
should be enough that a copy of the affidavit is forwarded promptly. This is
particularly true in the case of subcontractors, because the owner has no obli-
gation to subcontractors unless he receives a notice, and if he receives a notice,
he is made aware of the identical claim which would be embodied in the
affidavit. The affidavit requirement exists primarily for the benefit of third
parties; its delivery to the owner should not be accorded so lofty a priority.
Finally, as between the parties to a contract, there seems to be no reason
why the filing of the affidavit should be required. Furthermore, as is the case
with the constitutional lien, actual knowledge in a third-party purchaser or
mortgagee should be tantamount to the constructive notice afforded by filing
the affidavit.'
After the rights of third parties are protected, the remaining impediment to
a no-formality mechanic's lien law is the necessity for limiting the liability of
the owner and his property to a scope within his control. The owner can limit
the amount of the original contractor's lien by regulating the amount due
under the original contract. But, having no contractual privity with subcon-
tractors, the owner has no means of controlling the amount of their aggregate
claims, the total of which may far exceed the original price he contracted to
pay. Texas long ago attacked the problem by absolving the owner from liability
in excess of the original contract price if he pays the original contractor prior
to receipt of a subcontractor notice and pays the appropriate noticing subcon-
tractors after notice is received. This solution necessarily places the primary
burden on the subcontractor to forward proper, timely notices. The Hardeman
Act added a requirement of notice to the original contractor with its own
contingent time parameters.
There are other ways to limit the owner's liability. For example, in Utah..7
the burden is on the owner to post notice to workmen on his property of pay-
ments made to a contractor. Subcontractors have a lien to the full extent
of the contract price less any payments of which they had notice prior to per-
formance. No part of the contract price can be made payable or paid prior to
the date set for commencement of the work. In Illinoise0" it is the contractor's
duty to supply the owner a verified statement of the names of all parties
3°3TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5467 (Supp. 1972).
"4 The present statute sets forth a profusion of alternatives. Id.
""Ild. art. 5453, 5 1.
"' See note 187 supra, and accompanying text.
30'UTAH CODE ANN. S 38-1-22 (1966).
"0'° ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, S 5 (1966).
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furnishing labor and materials and the amount due each. The owner is required
to withhold payment until such statement is furnished him. Unless written
protest is made by the owner, subcontractors so named have a lien for their
entire debt.
While the procedures adopted in the states of Utah and Illinois leave much
to be desired, they avoid problems created by limiting the owner's liability to
the original contract price. In many states where the owner's liability is so
limited, subcontractors' liens are entirely avoided by payments made to the
contractor prior to the receipt of notice. Texas alleviated this problem, to some
extent, with the ten percent statutory retainage requirement. A very few other
states, notably Florida,"' also employ a mandatory retainage requirement to
hold a fund for unpaid subcontractors.
The concept of trapping funds with notice, coupled with a mandatory
percentage retainage requirement, is as workable as any and better than most.
Unfortunately, technicalities in the Texas statute have severely handicapped
an otherwise sound concept.
The form of subcontractor notice was agreeably simplified by the Hardeman
Act, but the confusion as to the circumstances in which a warning is required
should be eliminated. The main difficulty, however, lies in the profusion of
alternative kinds of notices with differing time limits. There seems to be no
compelling reason for the separate notice requirements applicable to specially
fabricated materials and retainage contracts. In the instances now dealt with
under these statutory categories, notice given after performance should suffice.
The advance notice required for specially fabricated materials serves only to
guard against false claims, but proof of the falsity of such claims that special
fabrication was ordered seems no more difficult than proof of the falsity of
claims that materials were delivered but misdirected to another job site.
Furthermore, the sparse benefits of the optional notice available for retainage
contracts hardly merit the space it occupies in the statutes."'
Undoubtedly, the most burdensome technicality introduced by the Harde-
man Act is the requirement that subcontractors who contract with subcon-
tractors must give notice of unpaid accounts to the original contractor within
thirty-six days of the accrual of indebtedness. The time period for sending the
contractor notice is so brief that a claimant may scarcely be aware of the de-
linquency of the account before it expires. Furthermore, the requirement places
the burden entirely on the subcontractor to determine who the original con-
tractor is, and gives him little time to do so.
The purpose of the contractor notice is to spare the original contractor from
the risk of paying twice for the same materials. If he pays his subcontractor
at a time when the latter has not paid his suppliers, the suppliers may never-
theless cause withholding by the owner to pay their claims; the notice is
supposed to keep the contractor advised of such unpaid bills. But a notice
received thirty-six days after accrual of the suppliers' debt comes too late to
permit withholding from the subcontractor whose account falls due and payable
on a thirty-day basis, as is customary. Moreover, the statute does not permit
801FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.06(3) (1969).
810TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5463 (Supp. 1972).
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withholding by an original contractor, as it does in the case of an owner. A far
better device would be a requirement that subcontractors furnish proof of pay-
ment of their suppliers before becoming entitled to payment by the contractor.
Deleting the thirty-six-day contractor notice would go a long way toward
reducing the frequency of incidents in which subcontractors lose their liens
through technicalities. Under the current procedure owners may defeat legiti-
mate lien claims under the fund-trapping or statutory retainage provisions
because of a subcontractor's failure to give the contractor notice, even though
owner notices were given properly and the contractor suffered no detriment
from lack of such notice. Often contractors may have actual notice of the
subcontractor's claim, but defeat the lien for lack of the formal notice. Even
if the provision is retained, surely no one should be heard to complain of a
lack of formality except one for whose protection the formality is required.
The fund-trapping procedure would benefit from simplification by making
the authorization to withhold accrue in every case on receipt of the notice. The
contingent alternatives of article 5463 contribute little but confusion to the
overall scheme.
Article 5469, the statutory retainage provision, is in need of a more
thoroughgoing revision. Now that the mandatory retainage fund is available
to all subcontractors, it holds substantial promise as a means of securing sub-
contractor claims. But the percentage required could profitably be made higher
-at least during the period prior to completion. To require a fifteen percent
or twenty percent retainage prior to completion and ten percent for thirty
days thereafter would substantially improve the prospects for unpaid subcon-
tractors. Moreover, the preference now given to artisans and mechanics re-
quires close scrutiny. If a preference is to be given to workmen over material-
men, perhaps it should be limited to laborers on an hourly, daily, or weekly
wage. Also, some pressing ambiguities in article 5469 can best be solved
by legislative action. The dilemma of the Hayek..1 case and the issues of the
Lennox Industries,1' Hunt,"8 and W & W Floor Covering"4 cases should be
dealt with after careful deliberation to arrive at solutions compatible with
public policy. It is awkward to have such questions judicially determined on
the basis of presumed legislative intent.
Finally, the preeminent necessity is to simplify the statutes. In drafting
legislation the benefits of simplicity can outweigh the minor equities of multi-
farious, complex provisions. This is particularly true with lien-perfecting pro-
cedures, which, for the most part, are routinely administered by laymen. The
development of our mechanic's lien laws has been a relentless progression from
the simple to the complex, which is not to be equated with qualitative progress.
To reverse the direction will be a prodigious undertaking, but it will be worth
the effort.
"11Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972); see text accompanying
note 173 supra.
"12 Lennox Indus., Inc. v. Phi Kappa Sigma Educ. & Bldg. Ass'n, 430 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1968); see text accompanying note 168 supra.
" Hunt Developers, Inc. v. Western Steel Co., 409 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1966); see text accompanying note 131 supra.3'W & W Floor Covering Co. v. Project Accept. Co., 412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1967), error ref. n.r.e.; see text accompanying note 161 supra.
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